Cruel Holiness: Good, Evil, Vice, Virtue, and Sin

Grave Indignities: The Auction of the Watercolors

William Blake and the Age of Revolution at York
AN ILLUSTRATED QUARTERLY

www.blakequarterly.org

VOLUME 40 NUMBER 2 FALL 2006

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Blake/An Illustrated Quarterly is published under the sponsorship of the Department of English, University of Rochester. Subscriptions are $60 for institutions, $30 for individuals. All subscriptions are by the volume (1 year, 4 issues) and begin with the summer issue. Subscription payments received after the summer issue will be applied to the current volume. Addresses outside the U.S., Canada, and Mexico require a $15 per volume postal surcharge for surface delivery, or $20 for airmail. Credit card payment is available. Make checks payable to Blake/An Illustrated Quarterly. Address all subscription orders and related communications to Sarah Jones, Blake, Department of English, University of Rochester, Rochester NY 14627-0451. Back issues are available; address Sarah Jones for information on issues and prices, or consult the web site.

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INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER: 0160-628X. Blake/An Illustrated Quarterly is indexed in the Modern Language Association's International Bibliography, the Modern Humanities Research Association's Annual Bibliography of English Language and Literature, American Humanities Index, Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Current Contents and the Bibliography of the History of Art.

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Front cover: Watercolor for "The Descent of Man into the Vale of Death" (framing lines cropped here), later engraved by Schiavonetti, bought in (i.e., unsold) at $480,000. Photo courtesy of Sotheby's New York. See page 66.

Back cover: "Friendship," known previous to 2001 only in the reference to it in the first 1805 prospectus, bought for $270,000 by a private collector. Photo courtesy of Sotheby's New York.
Cruel Holiness and Honest Virtue in the Works of William Blake

BY HARRY WHITE

Even some of Blake's leading interpreters have failed to come to terms with the radical nature of his assault on the moral virtues. Frye writes that for Blake there "can be no such thing, strictly speaking, as an evil act; all acts are good ..."; according to Nurmi, "Good and evil, as the religious understand them, do not exist, says Blake." Both statements suggest that Blake had his own understanding of good or of good and evil, when in truth he believed there really is no such thing as an evil or a good act as anyone understands it. That is why he deliberately identified all acts as virtuous, not good, as Frye would have it.

Blake was an antinomian Christian who refrained from advancing a moral position of his own and who confronted any and all beliefs in the moral law from a skeptical, nominalist standpoint consistent with the theory of knowledge he applied to all rational systems. What his writings advance is not a normative but a descriptive ethic, detailing the nature of our ideas of good and evil, how they arise, the harmful effects they have on individuals, and why they inevitably lead to conflict.

None of this means that Blake did not concern himself with whether men lead virtuous lives, only, as we shall see, that he understood vice and virtue to be completely different from good and evil.

Good and Evil

We might start by taking Blake at his word when he wrote quite straightforwardly and without qualification, "Moral Virtues do not Exist they are Allegories & dissimulations" (Vision of the Last Judgment, E 563). All "Error," Blake believed, "is Created Truth is Eternal"; for him "Evil is Created," and so is the traditional belief in sin: "He [Satan] created Seven deadly Sins drawing out his infernal scroll, / Of Moral laws" (Vision of the Last Judgment, E 565; Jerusalem 49:70, E 199; Milton 9:21-22, E 103). These errors and dissimulations are created whenever men mistake or misrepresent the allegories which seem to be real to their creators for what truly is real. They arise in Ulro where "What seems to Be: Is; To those to whom / It seems to Be, & is productive of the most dreadful / Consequences to those to whom it seems to Be" (Jerusalem 32:51-53, E 179).

Blake thus attacked the moral virtues from a nominalist standpoint, showing that one of the most dreadful consequences of the sleep of Ulro is the belief that the abstract terms good and evil denote actual characteristics within persons—a belief no different in kind from the equally erroneous opinion that material substance refers to a thing that actually exists in nature or that Nobodaddy identifies a being abiding in the distant sky. "Goodness or Badness," Blake noted, "has nothing to do with Character" (On Homers Poetry, E 269).

Like all other abstractions, good and evil are created by "the Reasoning Power," in this case by taking "the Two [real, existing] Contraries which are called Qualities ... / ... [and naming] them Good & Evil / From them ... [making] an Abstract, which is a Negation" (Jerusalem 108-10, E 152-33). Here and elsewhere, Blake used the term negation, meaning an "unreal thing, a nonentity" (see negation in the OED), to identify any abstraction which the reasoning faculty creates and which men then mistake for an existing entity or quality. "Negations [like good and evil] Exist Not," although rationalists often presume that they do because their reasoning power has produced a "false appearance which appears to the reasoner" (Jerusalem 17:34, E 162; Milton 29:15, E 127).

Although Blake defined good and evil as negations that "Exist Not" and insisted that "Negations are not Contraries" (Jerusalem 17:34, 17:33, E 162), and although Nurmi has warned that "the contraries, though opposed to each other, are not negations," negations and contraries are quite closely related, as the passage from Jerusalem (10:8-10, above) reveals, and that is perhaps one reason why readers tend to assign a false reality to good and evil—they mistake these negations for contraries. For example, Bandy reads the passage from Jerusalem to mean that if what she calls "the two contraries of Good and Evil are not separated ... they function in harmony ..." (my italics). Stewart cites the statement in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell that "Without Contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to Human existence," and concludes that, for Blake, the "contraries of Love/Hate, Reason/Energy and Good/Evil are 'necessary to Human Existence.'" Blake, however, did not list good and evil among the contraries. It is the next sentence which reads "From these contraries spring what the religious call Good & Evil" (Marriage 3, E 34).

The current essay follows up on Blake's ideas regarding skepticism, rationalism, and empiricism covered in Harry White, "Blake's Resolution to the War Between Science and Philosophy," Blake/An Illustrated Quarterly 39.3 (winter 2005-06): 108-25. Of necessity some points are repeated. It also seeks to give a written body to the things I learned in discussions with Brian Wilkie, who was my friend and mentor for many decades.

1. Frye 55.

5. Bandy 53.
6. Stewart 45.
Even Nurmi, who points out quite rightly that “Good and Evil are merely abstractions,” then immediately goes on to suggest something rather different when he writes that in “The Marriage, he [Blake] explains ‘what the religious call Good & Evil’ really are.” I shall return to this passage later, and I am perhaps quibbling to make a point we need to keep in mind, which is that good and evil in Blake really are nothing. When we read Blake’s writings on good and evil, we need to understand that if he is not identifying good and evil as abstract non-entities, as fictitious creations of the reasoning faculty, then what we are reading is his analysis of what others ordinarily (mis)take good and evil to be and not what he thought good and evil really are or truly ought to be. The sections from Jerusalem and Marriage describe how and why this mistake so often occurs. They describe the origin and genesis of our ideas of good and evil, showing how the negations of good and evil, though not contraries, nevertheless do spring from them: the reasoning power “makes” or “creates” these abstract non-entities whenever men “call” or “name” the existing contraries they do experience “good” or “evil.”

“Self Evident Truth,” for Blake, “is one Thing and Truth the result of Reasoning is another Thing” (annotations to Bacon, E 621). He set “Downright Plain Truth” against “Reasoning [which] is Nothing” and insisted that any man could “Know Truth at Sight” (annotations to Watson, An Apology for the Bible, E 618; annotations to Reynolds, E 659). He sought throughout his writings to expose the error, common to rational systems of various kinds, of reifying the abstractions the reasoning power creates and readily or deliberately committing what linguistic philosophers now call a “category mistake”: mistaking one category, abstract non-entities which seem real to the rationalist (“Truth the result of Reasoning”), for another category, entities that actually are real (“Self Evident Truth”). When considering the moral virtues, Blake repeatedly categorized them as products of “the Reasoning Power”: “Rational Truth,” he contended, “[is the] Root of Evil & Good” (Jerusalem 10:7-16, E 152-53; For the Sexes: The Gates of Paradise, E 268), and he insisted that good and evil which rationalists create should not be mistaken for plain truths that every man can know at sight.

The distinction Blake made between the rational moral arguments that a few philosophers create and which are open to doubt and what is evident to everyone is as old as antiquity. As Diogenes Laertius wrote regarding Pyrrhonian skepticism: “concerning the things the dogmatists assert definitely with argument, ... we suspend judgement because of their being non-evident.” Specifically, “there is nothing which is good or bad for everyone ...; therefore, there is nothing good or bad by nature.” With the rise of empirical science, the differences between rational truth and plain truth were even more sharply defined, and Blake’s distinction between rational truth and truth evident at sight could have come right out of Hume, who clearly distinguished the “relation of ideas” from “matters of fact.”

Blake’s regular use of terms like error, dissimulation, false appearance, or delusion to describe our ideas of good and evil should help us better understand his approach, which was not to inform his readers of what he thought to be right and wrong, but true and false. Blake’s writings aim to expose the fallacy of moral realism. For him, the belief that men could have experience and knowledge of good and evil as existing entities or characteristics, that such things were or ought to be self-evidently true to any reasonably sensible individual, amounted to a cognitive mistake, and Blake attacked that mistake at its foundations, representing both the theophany on Sinai and the fall in Eden in such a way as to reveal how there is fundamentally nothing logical, reasonable, or just about the way we arrive at our ideas of right and wrong.

In The First Book of Urizen, he showed that the book of laws Urizen unfolds does not descend from on high, but arises instead out of “the depths of dark solitude” and contains what Urizen acknowledges to be the “secrets of dark contemplation / By fightings and conflicts dire, / With terrible monsters” (4:6, E 71; 4:26-28, E 72). Blake thus represented the Mosaic law as a symptom of mental disorder posing as revelation, and he portrayed humankind first coming to judge in terms of good and evil in very much the same way. The so-called Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil is shown to be not a source for knowledge of any kind, but a “dismal shade / Of Mystery” that is rooted entirely in feelings of ill will and which bears only the “fruit of Deceit”—”the fruit / Of Urizen’s Mysterious tree” (see “The Human Abstract,” E 27; Four Zoas 87:13-14, E 369; “A Poison Tree,” E 28). Indeed, “A Poison Tree” offers one of the newest refutations of Milton’s attempt to justify the ways of God to man, placing the blame for the death and woe humankind suffers from on a wrathful God who seeks to tempt us with what we desire so that he can punish us for acting on our desires.

The righteous have the arrogance to claim that they and they alone have discovered or had revealed to them what is true for all humankind: “Here alone I ... / Have written the secrets of wisdom,” Urizen proclaims, “Laws of peace, of love, of unity: / ... / One King, one God, one Law” (Urizen 4:24-40, E 72). In response to these claims of moral reason, wisdom, and revelation, Blake advanced an emotive theory of morality to show that emotional turmoil and hateful feelings have been and remain the true and ultimate source for our ideas of good and evil. The moral virtues are nothing more than rationalizations of personal feelings which give to those feelings an objectivity and universality they do not have and a legitimacy they do not deserve. According to Blake, our ideas of good and evil did not originate, as traditionally taught, with fallen desires. They do arise from desires and emotions, such as wrath.

8. Inwood and Gerson 181.

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or hate, but come about only through a rationalization—a misunderstanding and misrepresentation—of those desires, for as we have seen, it is not desire of any kind, but "Rational Truth [which is the] Root of Evil & Good" (For the Sexes: The Gates of Paradise 16, E 268). "Reasoning upon its own Dark Fiction" (Everlasting Gospel, E 520), the reasoning power creates in us monstrous misconceptions regarding our feelings and desires that are not original to or inherent in our humanity. It is after all "Desire ... & all other Affections [that] are Natural, but Understanding is Acquired" and "Thought alone can make monsters, but the affections cannot" (annotations to Swedenborg, E 602, 603). Accordingly, Oothoon tries to convince Theotormon to rid himself of the monstrous thoughts he has acquired by recalling the natural affection he felt for her: "Religious dreams and holy vespers, light thy smoky fires," she says, "Once were thy fires lighted by the eyes of honest morn" (Visions of the Daughters of Albion 6:14-15, E 49).

The terms Blake employed to discredit any and all moral systems are not evil or wrong, but, as we have seen, error or delusion, and now, mystery and deceit. Accordingly, he assigned to Urizen the dual role of architect of the physical world and primeval priest (Urizen chaps. 1-2, E 70-72) because he understood the error of mistaking rational abstractions for concrete realities to be the underlying common cause for Urizen's creation of both "globes of attraction" and the moral law "in books form'd of metals" (Urizen chap. 2, E 71-72). It was not Blake's intention to heap everything he hated onto Urizen, like some mad romantic attacking everything reasonable, nor to lump indiscriminately together everyone whose ideas he disliked. His purpose was to show that, first and foremost, the problem of good and evil is not a matter for moral consideration, but for intellectual analysis. The struggle for him is not that of good versus evil, which has been the cause of so many martyrdoms and wars, but involves mental fight regarding truth and error: "The Combats of Truth & Error is Eating of the Tree of Life" (Vision of the Last Judgment, E 563), and unlike the cruel combatants of good and evil, "the Soldier who fights for Truth, calls his enemy his brother" (Jerusalem 38:41, E 185). Thus Blake criticized men as diverse as Moses, Plato, and Locke, not for the reason that he understood them or anyone else to be morally wrong, but rather because he found them all, like Urizen, to be the dupes and perpetrators of abstract delusions: "Moses beheld upon Mount Sinai forms of dark delusion"—the "abstract Law" given also to "Trismegistus ... / ... Pythagoras Socrates & Plato" (Song of Los 3:17-19, E 67). Similarly, Blake identified Satan, in his role as moral lawgiver, as "Newtons Pantocrator weaving the Woof of Locke" (Milton 4:11, E 98) because the "Fiend of Righteousness" works by the same inductive method that misleads scientists into mistaking their generalizations and resultant abstract laws for real things: "You accumulate Particulars, & murder by analyzing, that you / May take the aggregate; & you call the aggregate Moral Law" (Jerusalem 91:26-27, E 251).

Blake understood the mathematical principles of natural philosophy along with the principles of the moral law that a Newton or a Moses created to be fundamentally the same—systematic creations of the reasoning faculty that have no valid correspondent to the things we do experience and know. As "There is no Such Thing as a ... Natural Cause" (annotations to Bacon, E 626; my italics), there is also no such thing as the moral law, nor do any of the non-entities that compose it denote any things we experience. So while Paul believed that "nothing good dwells within me" (Rom. 7.18), Blake contended that neither good nor evil dwells anywhere in man:

Aristotle gave to morality what it does not have, an actual location within men, and made it a defining characteristic of our personalities. Urizen makes the same mistake when he says that the "Seven deadly Sins" are actually that "Which the bosoms of all inhabit," as does Vala when she claims to "have looked into the secret Soul ... / And in the dark recesses found Sin" (Urizen 4:29-30, E 72; Jerusalem 22:14-15, E 167).

Whatever Blake came to understand sin to be, he always insisted that it is not some quality or characteristic that inhabits and therefore can be observed within the bodies or souls of men. Sin is not original to our humanity, as Christian orthodoxy has been claiming since ancient times: "Remove away that blackning church / Remove away that marriage hearse / Remove away that ____ of blood / You'll quite remove the ancient curse" ("An Ancient Proverb," E 475). Just as he noted that Aristotle located goodness and badness within characters and thereby mistakenly made them identifying characteristics of individuals, so when Blake took up the issue of sin, he was equally intent on showing that it is a mistake to believe that sin inhabits and therefore characterizes individuals or humanity in general. Individuals by their actions inhabit—exist within—a state of sin, and not the other way around. To say that a man is a sinner or is good may seem to be the same as saying that he is wise or is tall, but they don't mean the same thing. Such statements fail to "Distinguish ... States from Individuals in those States" and in "cruel holiness" impute iniquity to individuals rather than states (Milton 32:22, E 132; Jerusalem 49:64-71, E 199). Compare the statements "The First Book of Urizen is an epic poem" and "The First Book of Urizen is a treasonous and blasphemous poem." The first describes an immutable characteristic of the poem itself, the second its temporary status relative to certain church and state laws at particular times and places, but nothing about any characteristic of the poem itself.

From first to last Blake aimed to relocate our notions of good, evil, and sin. He redefined good and evil as abstract non-entities and placed them in Ulro, a void "Outside of Existence" (Milton 41:37, E 143), and although he understood
sin, unlike good and evil, really to exist, he believed that it too had been similarly misplaced. To remove the idea of sin from the bosoms and souls of men, Blake came up with the idea of a state so that he could place sin, as he had good and evil, outside the souls of men. Sin does not (permanently) inhabit the bosoms of men; men “reside” in a state of sin, and a man “passes thro them [states like sin] like a traveller” (Vision of the Last Judgment, E 558, 556).

Blake’s conclusion regarding Aristotle is the same one Hume came to when he noted that “Vice and virtue ... are not qualities in objects ...”: “Take any action allow’d to be vicious .... Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice.” But if vice and virtue do not exist as matters of fact, Hume felt they do exist in “your own breast ... [as] a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards [an] action.”10 Blake believed, however, that nothing like vice or disapproval has any existence within the human breast—that is not where they originate. Vice and virtue, as traditionally defined, are not sentiments arising from some inborn tendency as the moral sense philosophers contended (to the contrary, morality, as we shall see, contradicts every man’s true self). They are not original to our emotional or imaginative life; they have no existence in eternity or experience. Feelings like love and hate are of course natural to man, but there is no inherent moral sense that inevitably leads men to feel that other men are virtuous or vicious, nor are men born with any feelings that by themselves would cause them to believe that what they desire is either good or evil.

So far, we have seen how Blake analyzed ideas of good and evil from the standpoints of epistemology and ontology, showing how we experience contraries (such as love and hate) and know them to exist, and how negations (such as good and evil) are non-entities that do not exist. In addition, as Nurmi has noted, “Negations like Good and Evil attempt to hinder and even destroy,”11 and Blake’s most devastating analysis was to show why they work that way—to show what it is about rational truths that inevitably and unavoidably leads men to promote tyranny, destruction, and warfare. One of the fundamental rules governing rational truths is the law of non-contradiction, which holds that if you conjoin a proposition and its negation the result is a contradiction and the statement is necessarily false. Accordingly, Blake showed how the moral virtues, rooted as they are in rational truth, operate in experience by negating one or the other of a pair of opposing contraries in the way that the reasoning power functions in abstract logical systems to eliminate contradictions.

Hume demonstrated how the “contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness ....”12 Blake similarly noted that “Contraries mutually Exist” and that “Contraries [are] equally true” (Jerusalem 17:33, E 162; 24:3, E 169). For him, the term contrary identifies the non-logical, contingent, and unsystematic way in which the minute particulars we experience relate to each other: a contrary is an existing quality or characteristic opposed to some other existing quality or characteristic, but not logically negating or falsifying it because no contrary can possibly contradict any other. No opposition or difference, no taste, opinion, or belief can possibly falsify or necessarily condemn any other as untrue or wrong. The wildness of the ass does not negate the meekness of the camel. There is no single abode of holiness, as Urizen proclaims, “for every thing that lives is holy,” and there is nothing illogical in stating that God made both the wrathful tyger and its contrary, the gentle lamb, for “Nothing [which does exist] is displeasing to God” (see Urizen 4:7ff., E 71; Visions of the Daughters of Albion 8:10, E 51; “The Tyger,” E 24-25; Vision of the Last Judgment, E 542). The pride of the peacock, the lust of the goat, the wrath of the lion, the nakedness of woman—these and other desires and feelings which the Accuser lists among the seven deadly sins all come from God (Marriage 8:22-25, E 36).

The relationships among contraries are non-contentious because “where [as in Beulah] Contrarieties are equally True” is also “Where no dispute can come” (Milton 30:1-3, E 129). Among all the contraries we experience, “Every thing possible to be believ’d is an image of truth” (Marriage 8:38, E 37), since whatever any man imagines cannot possibly be contradicted by another man’s images or beliefs. A “firm perswasion that a thing is so, make[s] it so” (Marriage 12, E 38); nothing else is required. Such thinking comes right out of the Protestant notion of the inviolability of the individual conscience, as well as the call for toleration within the state for divergent beliefs. For Blake, no individual or group of individuals has any right to declare that what others are firmly persuaded of is not true. So long as individuals are firmly and genuinely persuaded, there is for Blake no distinction between orthodox and heretical beliefs, between the supposedly one true and all other false religions. Insofar as the “Religions of all Nations” derive from “the Poetic Genius” and “the Spirit of Prophecy,” they are one (All Religions are One, E 1)—one, that is, until “a system [is is] formed” and priesthood begins by “Choosing forms of worship from poetic tales” (Marriage 11, E 38). Then domination, martyrdoms, and wars rule the world whenever systematic theology, moral reasoning, and sacred codes replace poetry and prophecy as the basis of religion.

Disputes can never occur among contraries, but when contraries are redefined in moral terms, when, for example, gentleness and meekness are said to be good, it follows necessarily—it is a simple matter of logic—that their contraries wrath and wildness must be thought of as evil. Explicit moral praise of anything implies a condemnation of its contrary. As soon as you define some joy or desire or belief as good, you negate and therefore condemn its contrary as evil, for unlike contraries, the negations that men derive from them cannot possibly function in harmony and are always at war: in Ulro
The logic of all moral judgment is such that it makes no difference whether you name something good or you call it evil. That is why I question the use of the term good to describe what Blake found acceptable, for he understood moral praise to be no less vicious than moral blame. He therefore objected even to those systems that demand what he recognized to be good things, because in every case the "Moral Virtues are continual Accusers of Sin & promote Eternal Wars & Domineering over others" (annotations to Berkeley, E 664). If, for example, you say that energy is bad, you necessarily pit it against reason as its negation. If you say that energy is good, you do the same thing by pitting it against reason as its negation. It's the same difference in either case. Goodness and moral virtue are for Blake "Cruel Goodnesses" and "cruel Virtue" (Milton 13:34, E 107; 22:44, E 117) because he found them to be negations no less than evil and vice, for the reason that they function in exactly the same way; they negate existing contraries which we would otherwise ordinarily accept as equally true.

It is thus not the content of any moral system that Blake objected to. Obviously he had no disagreement with "the laws of Kings & Priests" when, for example, he listed "Murder," "Theft," and "Backbiting" as vicious. His concern had to do with the way in which all moral systems operate. While he agreed that murder and theft are indeed vicious, he described them as vicious simply because they involve the "restraint on action" and "Hindering Another" (annotations to Lavater, E 601; my italics). Blake was certainly not seeking to identify points of agreement. Rather, he was considering how the whole concept of vice and virtue has been misapplied. He wanted the term vice to be applied no longer to the "propensity," the "feature of the man," or "the Staminal Virtues of Humanity." To do so is to apply moral judgment to individual characteristics rather than to behavior which hinders or restrains action in oneself or others. No one's virtues or features can be said in and of themselves to hinder another's. They do not define how a person chooses to interact with others. Blake wanted the terms vice and virtue to be used as descriptions of how we act, fail to act, or hinder others from acting (more on this in the following section).

To contend, as Stewart does, that for Blake "evil is important and necessary" and "has to be transformed into good"13 flies in the face of every statement Blake made about the desolation that the delusion of good and evil brought down upon human existence—"Eating of the Tree of Knowledge of Good & Evil" being one of only two things he said was displeasing to God (Vision of the Last Judgment, E 564). What Blake repeatedly said is that we should refrain from all moral denomination and judgment because nothing good can come from calling, naming, identifying, or labeling anything evil or good. He did not call on men to refrain from doing evil, but to stop attempting to be holy and righteous: "To be Good only is to be / A Devil or else a Pharisee" (Everlasting Gospel, E 521). Nor did he envision the transformation of evil into good. If we are to speak with any accuracy, we need to recognize that the crucial change he identified—and spoke out against—involves the righteous transforming contraries, such as love and hate or reason and energy, into the warring negations of good and evil.

Moreover, we need to understand that, for Blake, the righteous do not promulgate "Laws of Moral Virtue" to make men morally fit, but so that their "Humanity shall be no more," and "Human Nature shall no more remain" (Jerusalem 4:31-32, E 147; Four Zoas 11:23, E 306). "Good & Evil / ... / [are] ... a murderer / Of every Divine Member ..." (Jerusalem 10:9-13, E 153). The impoverishment and destruction of our divine humanity is no coincidental by-product of morality. On the assumption that deadly sin inhabits the bosoms of all, it is the very thing morality aims to accomplish—to bring "death / To every energy of man, and forbid the springs of life," to despise and mock "a Mental Gift in another; calling it ... sin," so that "All Mental Powers by Diseases" are bound (Jerusalem 31:11-12, E 177; 77, E 232; Everlasting Gospel, E 522). Disease, rather than moral fitness, is thus the first and last indication that the moral law has taken effect. The "Wastes of Moral Law" (Jerusalem 24:24, E 169) mean that the rose is sick, the youth pines away, Long John Brown dies, pestilence grows from unacted desires, Theotormon is tormented by sick dreams, plagues blight the marriage hearse, and the priest "lays his curse on the fairest joys" just as "the caterpillar chooses the fairest leaves to lay her eggs on," destroying individuals just like caterpillars destroy the leaves and branches of trees (see "The Sick Rose," E 23; "Ah! Sun-flower," E 25; "Long John Brown," E 496; Marriage 10:67, E 38; Visions of the Daughters of Albion 6:19, E 50; "London," E 26-27; Marriage 9:55, E 37). The "disease of Shame covers [Albion] from head to feet" (Jerusalem 21:3, E 166) like the running sores that covered Job from head to foot, and a "Tyrant is the Worst disease & the Cause of all others" (annotations to Bacon, E 625). Given his understanding that the moral law targets our humanity, Blake's response was simple: "Thy own humanity learn to adore" (Everlasting Gospel, E 520). His first and only commandment to all men was to "obey their Humanities, & not pretend Holiness" (Jerusalem 91:5, E 251).

Damon would have us believe that "Eventually Blake came to consider Sin a spiritual disease" and that for him "Disease is another word for Sin."14 Nathan, I think, is more correct to say that "sin is ... a word Blake uses almost as a synonym for mistake ...," a "mistake which is to be forgiven in short order."15 The position Blake retained to the end was that mental disease

13. Stewart 47, 44.
14. Damon 373, 104.
15. Nathan 132. See also "Error, Sin, and Forgiveness" in Damrosch and "Error and Forgiveness" in Moskal.
and disorder result not from sin, not as a spiritual descent into some dark night of the soul, but from the cruel condemnations of the righteous and the sinner's acceptance and internalization of the moral law. "It is only because of those who fail to forgive sin that sin gets to be the monster it so often is." If sin itself were the disease, then the cure Blake would have recommended would be to seek to become sinless or holy, and we know how he abhorred all those who make such claims for themselves and demand purity from others. "Holiness," he wrote, "is not The Price of Enterance into Heaven" (Vision of the Last Judgment, E 564; a further examination of sin will follow in the final section).

Antinomian and libertarian that he was, Blake believed there could be no "Liberty without Universal Toleration" (annotations to Boyd, E 635), and he recognized as well that universal toleration remains intolerable to the righteous. Liberty for all humanity can never be realized in a society where the righteous demand that all men must accept their peculiar notions of moral virtue: when the Sons of Albion first create their ideas of good and evil, Los recognizes it as a threat to his freedom and believes that he too "must Create a System, or be enslav'd by another Mans" (Jerusalem 10:20, E 153). This statement does not, as Bloom comments, amount to an apologia for Blake's own creation of a complex systematic vision.17 Essick might be right to identify it as a cultural motto of our time; the problem is that it was never intended to be one of Blake's "ringing declarations."18 Creation is not a positive thing for Blake. His writings repeatedly distinguish what is created by the few from what is self-evidently and eternally true for every man, and he used the terms or phrases "to create" or "creation" to describe error, the material and corporeal world, the Creator God, and the rational systems created to enslave the vulgar, all of which he sought to expose as dreadfully false. If we read on, we find that Los' creation of his own system occurs while he is in a state of distress, struggling with his own cursing spectre and seeking to dominate it: "Los, in fury & strength: in indignation & burning wrath / Shuddriring the Spectre howls. ... / [and] curses ... / Cities & Nations, Families & Peoples, Tongues & Laws," and "Los cries, Obey my voice & never deviate from my will / And I will be mercifull to thee ... / / If thou refuse, thy present torments will seem southern breezes / To what thou shalt endure if thou obey not my great will" (Jerusalem 10:22-36, E 153). His words echo Exodus: "If you will diligently hearken to the voice of the Lord your God ... and give heed to his commandments, and keep all his statutes, I will put none of the diseases upon you which I put on the Egyptians ..." (15.26).

Blake wished to believe that "The Word of God, [is] the only light of antiquity that remains unperverted by War" (On Virgil, E 270). However, the poet who dedicated himself to attacking "The Perversions of Christs words & acts ... & also the perversions of the Bible" (as he described Paine's work in his annotations to Watson, An Apology for the Bible, E 611) understood that all too readily and too often the labors of poet-prophets result in the creation of systems that the poet or others exploit to pervert mental into corporeal warfare so as to triumph over and enslave men. Blake showed by Los' actions what can happen when the "Spectre ... the Reasoning Power in Man" separates "From Imagination," and "thence frames Laws & Moralities" (Jerusalem 74:10-12, E 229). Then the poet forgets that "Morality" belongs "to Philosophy & not to Poetry" (On Homers Poetry, E 270), and he writes as if he were a priest.

By creating his own system, Los gives a body to falsehood and confronts his own damning spectre. He is therefore able to identify his error and return to his true poetic vocation, which is not to create systems that liberate some while enslaving all others, but in the end to liberate everyone by "Striving with Systems to deliver Individuals from those Systems" (Jerusalem 11:5, E 154). If we are looking for a ringing declaration of Blake's motto, that would be it. Blake's mission was to deliver individuals from the errors of systematic reasoning and the tyrannical moral and religious systems it creates.

Blake knew quite well that many works of art serve the religious dogmas of their day, so he insisted over and again throughout his writings that the poet writes as a prophet who announces and proclaims (which is what prophecy means),

17. Bloom, "Commentary" 931.
18. Essick 251.
but who does not command belief or obedience to the poet's voice. The true poet-prophet is distinguished by the fact that he does not command or curse as Urizen and the Spectre of Urthona do. As forcefully and fervently as he wrote, as systematic as his later prophecies became, Blake never thought, like Milton, that his mission was to justify the ways of God to man, for he never proclaimed of the systems he created that "the Gods had orderd such things" (see Marriage 11, E 38), although he realized and dramatized how poet-prophets could be tempted to make such claims.

The erroneous belief which every man's reasoning spectre is prone to, that there could be true, authoritative answers to questions like what are good and evil, right and wrong, serves only to enthrone authority figures who through their "metaphysics" come to "speak of themselves as the only wise" and to dismiss "all other men [as] fools, sinners, & nothings" (Marriage 19, 21, 23, E 42-43). That is what men who create the moral law seek, to raise themselves above all others so that a few may control and dominate the many.

What the priest and king refuse to recognize is that "Every Mans Wisdom is peculiar to his own Individ[u]ality" (Milton 4:8, E 98), and if perchance someone creates his own system so as not to be enslaved by another man's, he must understand that no system contains truths that must be evident to all good and reasonable men simply because they appear reasonable to the system's creator. A rational truth should never be mistaken for a self-evident truth. When, for instance, an Angel's "phantasy" of hell appears evident to him, he needs to realize—as he eventually does—that it is a false and delusory appearance resulting from his "metaphysics," "Analytics," and "systematic reasoning," and not anything he really sees (Marriage 19-21, E 42-43). As there is no place called hell evident to anyone, as there is no Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil growing anywhere but in the human brain, so there is also nothing self-evidently true for any man about the various concepts of good and evil some men create and seek to impose on everyone else. Anyone who claims that such things as good and evil, right and wrong, have been discovered by or were revealed to him, even if he has disappeared onto a mountaintop for forty days and nights, must be understood to be making an obviously false claim.

The truly good news, however, is that whereas "The Imagination is not a State: it is the Human Existence itself / ... / ... the Reason is a State / Created to be Annihilated ... / Whatever can be Created can be Annihilated" (Milton 32:32-36, E 132). Insofar as "Error is Created ... It is Burnt up the Moment Men cease to behold it" (Vision of the Last Judgment, E 565), so the error of moral virtue that men have created can be annihilated so that one day "Good & Evil are no more" (Everlasting Gospel, E 521). Then men and women may return to that paradise of innocent desire and affection that was lost once we ate from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil.

Vice and Virtue

Blake defined freedom as "the liberty both of body & mind to exercise the Divine Arts of Imagination" (Jerusalem 77, E 231). The political implications of his position might be made more clear by comparing that statement with one by a contemporary, Thomas Jefferson: "The error seems not sufficiently eradicated that the operations of the mind, as well as acts of the body, are subject to the coercion of the laws ...." To act freely without being restrained or hindered or compelled in one's actions by any laws is also what it meant for Blake to be virtuous. Blake had a clear conception of vice and virtue, but he understood vice and virtue to be something altogether different from good and evil. In an annotation that Bloom calls "the most profound, and the most central for a reader's understanding of Blake himself," Blake noted that Lavater makes every thing originate in its accident he makes the vicious propensity <not only> a leading feature of the man .... But as I understand Vice it is a Negative—It does not signify what the laws of Kings & Priests have calld Vice we who are philosophers ought not to call the Staminal Virtues of Humanity by the same name that we call the omissions of intellect springing from poverty.

Every mans <leading> propensity ought to be calld his leading Virtue ... But the Philosophy of Causes & Consequences misled Lavater as it has all his cotemporaries. Each thing is its own cause & its own effect. Accident is the omission of act in self & the hindering of act in another. This is Vice but all Act is Virtue. To hinder another is not an act it is the contrary it is a restraint on action both in ourselves & in the person hinderd, for he who hinders another omits his own duty. at the time. (annotations to Lavater, E 600-01)

We are so used to thinking or writing in the very terms Blake wished to avoid—i.e., good and evil—that we miss the central point of the annotation, and a lot more in Blake. For example, this is the passage Frye quotes, beginning with "Accident is the omission of act," when he comments that all acts are "good." Bloom also cites it to assert that "Blake's good is the active" and that what "is hindrance and not action is evil ...." Paley agrees that "Blake views evil as negative—'Hindering Another.'" Damrosch defies simple logic: "evil actions are not actions at all"; he does so because the term evil isn't appropriate to what Blake was writing about. When Frye omits Blake's initial statements regarding causes and consequences and when he and others write about good and evil, they ignore or miss the fact that first and foremost Blake was not commenting about morality—the terms good and evil occur nowhere in the annotation—but about a common misunderstanding.

22. Paley 15.
23. Damrosch 249.
regarding the true cause of human action. To appreciate fully this profound and central annotation, we need to understand the terms Blake did use, vice and virtue, and exactly what he intended them to mean and not to mean.

Blake understood virtue in the ancient sense of virtus (see Moskal for a similar analysis of virtue in Blake). Used positively by Blake, virtue refers to manliness, worthiness, or excellence. The term signifies not moral rectitude, but a quality or characteristic of a person, as when we say "by virtue of his wisdom or strength," and indicates that the person is acting in a manner consistent with his characteristic genius. Virtue implies action that is the expression of the staminal virtues of humanity, the stamen being the male reproductive organ of a plant; by defining virtue as staminal, Blake meant to distinguish "active masculine virtue" from feminine "passivity" and the "laws of obedience" that repress virtue in men especially (Four Zoas 43, E 328-29). For Blake, virtue differs from vice not as good differs from evil, but as action that is the expression of internal impulses differs from activity which derives from and is motivated by external causes. Whether these external causes be the moral laws of obedience or even the rules of art laid down by Joshua Reynolds, acting as a consequence of such causes amounts to vice. Along these lines, Blake disagreed with Reynolds' contention that (in Blake's words) "Genius May be Taught" and that "Inspiration is a Lie": "I do not believe that Rafael taught Mich. Angelo or that Mich. Ang: taught Rafael. .....I do not believe the tales ... [that] militate against Individual Character" (annotations to Reynolds, E 642-43). As Blake saw it, expression or activity is vicious not because it is morally wrong. That is not what Blake meant by vice. He found it vicious simply because it is externally motivated. Vice is the negation of virtue because in life or art it omits, denies, prohibits, or hinders in self and others the expression of intellect and of each person's leading propensities and individual characteristics.

Blake's statement that "all Act is Virtue" is not fundamentally a statement of moral preference, but of fact—not a definition of what is good, but a reminder of the fact that all truly human acts proceed from, are the effects of, one's virtues. Actually to murder or steal, even if done impulsively, could never be virtuous for the reason that it hinders others, as do the commandments not to murder or steal. To be virtuous does not involve the practice or avoidance of any particular set of rules, but means simply to act in such a way as never to hinder oneself or others as murderers, thieves, and the righteous do.

If the appropriate terms are applied as Blake used them, then we can better understand his central position. Earlier I quoted from Nurmi's definition of what he claims Blake said ""Good & Evil really are."" Here is how he explains it: for Blake what the religious call ""Good is the passive that obeys Reason[,] Evil is the active springing from Energy.""24 I would modify Nurmi's definition by saying that what the religious call evil Blake said really is virtue and what they call good really is vice. In other words, Blake's virtue, acting in such a way as to give expression to one's humanity, is what the religious call evil, ""the active springing from Energy""; vice, activity which is the result of outside forces moving or hindering us, they name good, ""the passive that obeys Reason,"" in this case the reasons church and state concoct to hinder the expression of one's humanity.

In time, ""the restrainer [of desire] or reason usurps its [desire's] place & governs the unwilling"" (Marriage 5, E 34), so that those whom church and state define as good men are those who do not act on their own desires but are governed by the laws of priests and kings, just as, according to the philosophy of causes and consequences, objects in the material world are presumably governed by the mechanical laws of nature. These unwillingly good people who frequent Blake's works have little or no mind of their own or character to speak of and are always blaming "the Father of the ancient men" or "Priests in black gowns" as the cause for their failures to act on their own, and much like the fox they condemn the trap and not themselves (see "Earth's Answer," E 18; "The Garden of Love," E 26; Marriage 8:28, E 36). They are not self-motivated and self-regulated, moving as in Eden by their own desires and impulses, "Wheel within Wheel in freedom ... harmony & peace," but they behave in accordance with mechanistic principles, moving others and being moved by them, "wheel without wheel, with cogs tyrannic / Moving by compulsion each other" (Jerusalem 15:14-20, E 159).

The reason Lavater and his contemporaries mistook not evil for good, but vice for virtue is that they had been misled in their understanding of the way causality operates in all living things. Natural philosophy, the philosophy of causes and consequences, had triumphed by explaining the phenomena of the material world in terms of efficient or mechanical causality, which is to say, every thing was viewed as the cause of every other thing but never as its own cause, the mind for sensationist psychologists being "only a natural organ subject to Sense" (There is No Natural Religion, E 2). Blake knew that this view was obviously false, and he presented evidence familiar to everyone to refute it: he noted, for example, that all creatures, such as wolves, camels, bees, and pigeons, have the same sense organs and they should therefore be affected and behave in the same way, yet "are their habitations. / And their pursuits, as different as their forms and as their joys" (Visions of the Daughters of Albion 3:2-9, E 47). Similarly, "Every Man has Eyes Nose & Mouth this Every Idiot knows but he who enters into & discriminates most minutely the Manners & Intentions the ... Characters in all their branches is the alone Wise or Sensible Man ..." (Vision of the Last Judgment, E 560). Even though men, like animals, have the same sense organs, "Man varies from Man more than Animal from Animal of Different Species" (annotations to Reynolds, E 656).

Moreover, since each man tends to act according to his character, not circumstances, character rather than circumstance is the ultimate cause of their being honest men or crimi-
endure greater hardships with fortitude. We must therefore alledge as the cause of his thievery, for many honest people are as indignant against honesty & enthusiasm as they are against honesty & enthusiasm for cunning & artifice (annotations to Boyd, E 635). Not that Blake believed men's characters could or ought to be changed. "Individual identities never change" (Milton 32:23, E 132), and it is a fundamental mistake of the moral virtues that they seek to reform men's characters or identities rather than forgive their behavior.

The identity of sense organs, along with the variety of behavior observable in men and animals, proves that such behavior cannot be the effect of sense experience, but has to be the outcome of the different intentions, pursuits, and propensities that each living thing brings into this life. "Every thing in Eternity shines by its own internal light" (Milton 10:16, E 104; my italics), and that light remains within us while we are in the world of experience: "Innate Ideas, are in every man born with him" (annotations to Reynolds, E 648). With its uncritical devotion to mechanical causality, however, contemporary philosophy cannot accept that in the living world "Each thing is its own cause" (annotations to Lavater, E 601). It erroneously presumes everything that a person does to "originate in its accident," which is to say that human action is contingent on something else and occurs unintentionally without expressing any essential characteristic of a person's humanity.

The laws of kings and priests derive not from a contemporary error but from the traditional belief that vice is and always remains a basic constituent of human nature, that the staminal virtues of humanity are vicious in and of themselves regardless of how we act. For the king and the priest, goodness does not actually involve or require doing good and not doing evil. Rather, for them, to be good means to suppress one's humanity. Both contemporary and traditional beliefs thus arrive at the same understanding: contemporary philosophy denies that men can and do act in accordance with their leading propensities; traditional religion insists that they shouldn't act in that way. The former holds that each thing is not its own cause, but acts or does not act according to how other persons or things move it, while the laws of kings and priests are established for the express purpose of preventing men from acting in accordance with their humanity. By demanding the omission of act in self, comparable to the scientific law's omission of cause in objects, the moral law aims to destroy the light of humanity that shines within us: it "Darkenest every internal light ... / ... / That every thing is fixd opaque without internal light" (Milton 10:17-20, E 104).

According to Blake, the moral virtues (not to be confused with Blake's virtue) inevitably promote (what Blake called) vice, that is, the hindering of action in self and others. So when Frye writes that "evil is negative: all evil consists in either self-restraint or restraint of others," he misses Blake's radically profound analysis of all morality, which is that all morality is vicious. Blake described morality as vicious not because he found it evil, but because of the way it works. For him, morality is vicious because it is in the nature of all morality, even that which is devoted to the most praiseworthy ends, to seek to realize its ends by means of hindrance and restraint. That is what Blake objected to in the moral virtues, not necessarily any particular ends they seek, but the means by which they attempt to achieve those ends. Frye's analysis might be better put this way: moral good, as well as moral evil, is negative—all good, along with evil, consists in either self-restraint or restraint of others.

In the last "Memorable Fancy" of The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Blake dramatized his distinction between virtue and vice on the one hand and good and evil on the other. In pl. 3 he has described what the religious call good and evil. In pls. 22-24 he answers them with his own definition of vice and virtue: an angel insists that "Jesus Christ [has] given his sanction to the law of ten commandments and ... all other men [are] fools, sinners, & nothings." The devil answers the angel by listing the commandments he claims Jesus refused to sanction: did not Jesus "murder those who were murdered because of him? ... steal the labor of others to support him?" etc. He concludes from his list that "no virtue can exist without breaking these ten commandments: Jesus was all virtue, and acted from impulse: not from rules" (Marriage 23-24, E 43).

What the devil offers is an object lesson in Paul's statement, "By the law we are all condemned," or, as Blake put it, "All Penal Laws court Transgression" (annotations to Watson, An Apology for the Bible, E 618). The Devil exposes the Angel as being devoted to the law simply because it establishes a hierarchy of belief which allows some to think of themselves as the only wise. Then the devil takes it from there, parodying the angel's attitude by showing how if one is inclined, as angels are, to judge everyone's activity according to the commandments, then he will find transgression everywhere and even Jesus' behavior will not escape condemnation.

After the devil has had his fun parodying the angel, he says what he truly believes: Jesus broke the law not because he sought to go against the law, but simply because he acted from impulse and not rules. Moskal believes that Blake "approves antinomianism" while realizing that "it has no independent conceptual foundations" because "any lawbreaking depends ... on prior lawgiving." Certainly antinomianism means "against the law," but it is not a term Blake employed,
so we shouldn't depend too heavily on it. Blake's ideal figures are not lawbreakers proclaiming "evil, be thou my good." Lawbreakers don't people his works as they do Schiller's or Byron's or Dostoyevsky's because Blake's ideal figures act not against the law, but independently of the law, purely according to their own impulses, virtues, and humanity. The poet is such an exemplary figure: whereas "the Philosopher is Dependent & Good," the "Poet is Independent & Wicked" (annotations to Boyd, E 634). The conceptual foundation for the type of person Blake approved of is independent, individual virtue; as the Boyd annotation suggests again, the moral terms of approval or disapproval, good and wicked, are applied by the religious to actions that might more obviously and more accurately be described simply as dependent or independent. Blake's intent was to show not only that the righteous view good in terms of dependency and obedience and oppose it to wickedness, which they define in terms of independence and impulse, but also that above all they are always applying moral judgment where it need not apply at all.

Whoever ignores the moral law is not an evildoer in Blake's eyes, but ideally someone who goes about his business obeying his humanity by exercising his particular mental gifts and caring not whether anyone's gifts are contrary to his own. Thus Blake's Devil does not contend, as Moskal claims, given her conception of Blake's antinomianism, that "Jesus' actions are motivated by the desire to break each of the commandments." How, for example, could Jesus have intended to have his disciples murdered? How could he have known they would have been martyred because of him? Moskal says that Jesus was prompted by "the sheer desire to violate laws" because he "acted from 'impulse, not from rules'" but to act out of a desire to violate the laws is to be moved by the laws and not by one's own impulse. Rebels against the law, such as Orc or Rintrah, are, equally along with those who obey the law, acting in view of the law and not in fulfillment of their desires. The Devil therefore does not assert that Jesus intended to do all the things the Devil pretends he did; rather, as parodist, he demonstrates how Jesus' actions may readily be interpreted as having broken the commandments if one is given to thinking as angels do. After all, anyone is free not to interpret what Jesus or anyone else did or does in moral terms.

The Devil's conclusion is a simple one, once we learn to fathom it. Like the Lavater annotation, it has to do with the springs of action: to act on impulse is by its very nature not to act by rules, and this according to the Devil is what it means to act virtuously. Virtuous action is described here, as in the annotation, as action which is self-motivated. Blake did not describe Jesus as good because he acted on impulse, but as virtuous. So, for example, if Jesus had honored his father and mother because the law commanded it, he would of course have been obeying the law and he would have been a good person for doing so, but he would not have been acting virtuously. If, however, Jesus had honored them on impulse, he would have been acting virtuously, but in so doing, he would have been breaking the law for no other reason than that his action was not obedient to it because it had been motivated by impulse operating independently of the law. For Blake, no virtue can exist without breaking the law simply because virtuous action is undertaken without considering what any law commands.

Here and elsewhere, Blake insisted that any genuinely virtuous individual can readily reject what the righteous demand because the crucial concern they have is not whether a person acts in ways that are good or bad, but dependent or independent—whether he acts obediently and not according to his own internal light. The problem the lawgiver would have with Blake's virtuous individual is not that he does the wrong thing, but that he does the right thing—or the wrong thing—for the wrong reason, that is, he is motivated by his own individual conscience and not by what the law tells him to do. Similarly, the problem Blake had with those whom the religious call "good" is not necessarily that they are doing wrong in his eyes, but that they are not virtuous individuals who genuinely express what they think, feel, and believe. No man, however good his behavior, can be considered virtuous who does good because he feels compelled to or for his personal advantage. You can't be virtuous if you do the right thing for the wrong reasons, and Blake called for absolute freedom from the Mosaic law, the laws of the kings and priests, not because he abhorred everything they thought holy. He called for freedom even from good laws because no man can be virtuous in his or anyone else's eyes who does good simply because the law requires it.

As the Leveller William Walwyn noted in 1646, "every man ought to be free in the worship and service of God—compulsion being the way to increase, not the number of converts, but the number of hypocrites." Blake had a name for these seemingly good men. He, too, called them hypocrites and also knaves. Knaves are "Christians in outward appearance," but "still a Knave." They are never anything but orthodox, always conforming and giving expression to received opinion: "all the Commentators on the Bible are Dishonest Designing Knaves who in hopes of a good living adopt the State religion." Because he is always striving to become like everyone else, a conventionally good person is someone who has "No Con-Science" and is "full of Self-Contradiction" (Vision of the Last Judgment, E 564; annotations to Watson, An Apology for the Bible, E 616; annotations to Reynolds, E 648). His outward appearance and behavior cannot be trusted to express what he truly thinks and feels, as is the case, for example, with Thetormon's "hypocrite modesty" (Visions of the Daughters of Albion 6:16, E 49).

29. Walwyn 15.
Since Blake wrote, numerous anthropologists and sociologists have observed exactly what he understood, that in almost all societies we know of morality is chiefly little more than an attempt to enforce social cohesion. As Thomas Jefferson noted: “Millions of innocent men, women, and children since the introduction of Christianity have been burnt, tortured, fined, [and] imprisoned” and for no other purpose than “to produce uniformity of opinion.” In almost every society, the measure of the goodness or badness of a person is typically not his or her beneficent or malevolent behavior, but his or her conformity to or deviance from certain arbitrarily established codes of conduct, without regard to what those codes entail or whether violating them would indeed harm anyone. A thoroughgoing nonconformist who “read[s] white” where others “read st black” (Everlasting Gospel, E 524) and whose writings are bursting with seditious, obscene, heretical, and blasphemous statements, Blake felt the pressures to conform all his life:

O why was I born with a different face Why was I not born like the rest of my race When I look each one starts! when I speak I offend Then I’m silent & passive & lose every Friend

Then my verse I dishonour. My pictures despise My person degrade & my temper chastise And the pen is my terror, the pencil my shame All my Talents I bury, and Dead is my Fame (letter to Butts, 16 August 1803, E 733)

The charge of treason which occasioned these lines was a painful reminder of the danger nonconformity posed to himself and his art, but it also illustrated once again that the moral virtues are not concerned with “whether a Man has Talents. & Genius? But whether he is Passive & Polite & a Virtuous Ass: & obedient .... If he is; he is a Good Man” (annotations to Reynolds, E 642). The aim of the Accuser is not to identify wrongdoers, but to impose his “principles of moral individuality,” and make just men do “what he knows is opposite to their own Identity” (Milton 9:26, E 103; Vision of the Last Judgment, E 565), just as the churches transform the man who disdains “to follow this Worlds Fashion” into an “Antichrist Creeping Jesus,” who is “Humble as a Lamb or Ass” (Everlasting Gospel, E 519, 520; for morality as conformity in Blake, see also Blackstone, especially 271ff.).

When Blake said, through Los, “I care not whether a Man is Good or Evil” (Jerusalem 91:54, E 252), he understood that an utter disregard for the moral law, as epitomized in Jesus’ impulsively virtuous actions, would in no way undermine a person’s moral fitness. Of what consequence can it be whether a man conforms to or deviates from the law? Any hypocrite or knave can conform to the law and any truly virtuous man can be condemned by it—the crucifixion of Jesus being history’s supreme example of a virtuous man the law destroyed. As Jefferson noted, there have been millions more.

What Blake saw in those whom society praises as good men is nothing more than conformity, hypocrisy, and knavery (“laws of obedience & insincerity / Are my abhorrence [Four Zoas 43:10-11, E 329]”). He was, however, no dismissive moral nihilist, but presented to his readers the ideal of an honestly virtuous man who does not resist “his genius or conscience, only for the sake of present ease or gratification” (Marriage 13, E 39). He insisted, moreover, that “God ... loves all honest men,” and “God does & always did converse with honest Men.” When honest men express themselves, they do so as God’s prophets, since the “voice of honest indignation is the voice of God” (annotations to Lavater, E 598; annotations to Watson, An Apology for the Bible, E 615; Marriage 12, E 38). There “will always be as many Hypocrites born as Honest Men” (Vision of the Last Judgment, E 564); still and all, we can reliably put our trust in honest persons because they always act according to who they are and what they think, feel, and believe, since they will permit nothing in the world of experience to change or destroy the virtues that define them:

Conscience in those that have it is unequivocal, it is the voice of God .... If Conscience is not a Criterion of Moral Rectitude What is it? He who thinks that Honesty is changeable knows nothing about it .... Virtue & honesty or the dictates of Conscience are of no doubtful Signification to any one[.] Opinion is one Thing. Princip[le] another. No Man can change his Principles[,] Every Man changes his opinions. He who supposes that his Principles are to be changed is a Dissembler who Disguises his Principles .... (annotations to Watson, An Apology for the Bible, E 613)

Sin

Some readers may be bothered and even disappointed by Blake’s emphasis on sin insofar as they see him departing from his more radical approach to the moral virtues and in his later works to be “increasingly driven back upon a conception which comes close to the traditional idea of sin.”

We can only speculate as to what motivated Blake to take up the issue of sin. Perhaps he felt as a Christian that he could not ignore it any longer and needed to address what just about every other Christian believed to be a real and most serious problem. Yet his attitude toward it was hardly close to established traditional views, and differed from orthodox conceptions so significantly on major aspects that one might suggest that he was driven to the idea of sin precisely because he wished his readers to reconsider their traditional understanding of it.

When writing about what was and is thought to be the most terrible accusation a Christian can level against anyone—that he is a sinner—Blake contended that sin does not, as tradi-


31. Damrosch 249.
tion tells us, make us an "outcast from the Divine Presence" (Jerusalem 78:33, E 234), for "Sin is [not] displeasing to God," although the accusation of sin, "Eating of the Tree of Knowledge of Good & Evil," is (Vision of the Last Judgment, E 564). Contrary to traditional belief, Blake said he did not "consider the Just ... to be in a Supreme State" and held that "Holiness is not The Price of Enterance into Heaven" (Vision of the Last Judgment, E 563, 564). If the later Blake did indeed find sin real enough, he nevertheless insisted that it really is no big deal: "What is Sin," he wrote, "but a little / Error & fault that is soon forgiven" (Jerusalem 20:23-24, E 165).

"What was it," Kazin wonders, "that made him long at the end, above everything else, for 'forgiveness'?" Yet that guilt and longing don't show up in his letters. In his address "To the Public" (Jerusalem 3, E 145), Blake did call himself "most sinful," but consider how he put it: "I am perhaps the most sinful of men! I pretend not to holiness! yet I pretend to love ...." Perhaps the most sinful? We can easily infer from Blake's qualification that he was not terribly concerned with whether he was or was not most sinful. He was, however, most definite about the claim, which he stated without qualification, that he did not pretend to be holy and sought to love. That is what is stated most forcefully because it is of overwhelming importance. Accordingly, if Blake's characters can be said to long for anything, it is to be free of condemnation rather than guilt.

In the end, almost all of the references to sin come not in the form of mea culpa confessions, but of accusations individuals direct against those whom they should rather forgive and befriend. However much Blake came to write about sin, it would appear that the depth or extent of sin itself never concerned him terribly much. Instead, he took up the issue to insist that men should not trouble themselves and especially not burden others over it.

To the end, the problem Blake saw humanity facing hasn't to do with the sinner, but with the "Accuser" who "condemns ... Sin" and "all those ... who Calumniate & Murder <under Pretence of Holiness & Justice>" (Vision of the Last Judgment, E 556, 558). The problem of sin comes down to the same old problem of righteousness that Blake saw as the cause of cruelty, dominance, and enmity between those who should be brothers, friends, and lovers. The difference in the later works is that these issues are examined not so much as they were earlier on, in terms of the individual's relation to religious, political, and legal institutions and their oppressive codes and laws, but more so in terms of the ruinous effect they have on personal relations—on two or more individuals who could otherwise be close to each other in loving relationships were it not for the compulsion to accuse and condemn. Blake's ultimate aim in bringing up the idea of sin was not to examine or reexamine the nature of sin, nor to recommend how to avoid it, but to use a term familiar to everyone to take aim at the same targets he always focused on so as to save "those who have sinned [not from sin, but] from the punishment of the Law" (Jerusalem 31:6, E 177).

When Oothoon announces in Visions of the Daughters of Albion that she is pure (2:28, E 47), she is certainly not citing any change that has occurred within her, since she never was polluted. Later, in one of the finest and most insightful passages Blake or anyone else has ever written on the nature of sin and forgiveness (Jerusalem 61, E 211-12), he allowed that Mary's sin is real enough, and that is perhaps where the difference lies when we read the later Blake. It is, however, an insignificant difference to the extent that it does not affect in any way Blake's attitude toward what he understood to be the source of all our woe. As always, it is the accusation of sin, this time coming from Joseph as formerly from Theotormon, and not the sin itself, which Blake showed to be the cause of continued suffering and that which needs to be addressed and remedied. Indeed, a relatively early work like Visions of the Daughters of Albion offers Blake's most extensive, in-depth study of how happy love is tormented by the imputation of sin and pollution. It is a position Blake maintained to the end.

In his A Fiery Flying Roll (1649), Abiezer Coppe proclaimed, "Sin and transgression is finished and ended ... [.] Be no longer so ... wicked, as to judge what is sin, what not." Around the same time, Edward Burrough wrote that the "saints of God may be perfectly freed from sin in this life so as no more to commit it." Despite Blake's obvious affinities with and the possible influences of the radical nonconformists noted by Moskal, E. P. Thompson, and others, Blake never held that men could be freed from sin. Even so, he remained an antinomian to the end. The "stress on forgiveness in Blake's prophetic writing after 1800 might be regarded as antinomian in this sense": it "promised unconditional forgiveness for what it still recognized as sin." Indeed, we might go so far as to suggest that the stress on sin in the later Blake, his insistence that "There is none that liveth & Sinneth not!" (Jerusalem 61:24, E 212), seeks to identify a fundamental equality among all humanity and is alluded to for the specific purpose of disallowing anyone's right to assume a position of moral authority over his fellow men. Blake was no egalitarian when it came to defining the greater or lesser genius in men. The "Worship of God," he wrote, is honoring and "loving the greatest men best, each according / To his Genius" (Jerusalem 91:7-9, E 251). Yet he always insisted that in terms of right or wrong no man living has any claim to greater moral superiority over any other man. The earlier Blake tended to focus on the invalidity of all moral systems; later he took a more personal view, adopting the notion that every man sins to show how we are all morally equal. The stress in the later Blake is not on the division between sin and purity—that is never a concern—but on the difference be-

32. Kazin 53-54.

33. Quoted in Hill 121, 202.
34. Mee 58.
tween him who acknowledges that he is "sinful" like everyone else and does not "pretend ... to holiness" and the "Hypocrite ... whose profession is Virtue & Morality & the making Men Self-Righteous .... Pharisees & Hypocrites ... talking of the Virtues ... particularly of your own, that you may accuse others" (Jerusalem 3, "To the Public," E 145; 52, "To the Deists," E 201).

Blake initially responded to the requirements of the moral law with his rebellious devils and libertines who characteristically ignore or dismiss it, but, as it were, thereby leave the law standing to continue to dominate the vulgar. His concept of sin in the later works directly addresses the issue of righteous-ness in a way that encompasses all humanity. The alternative he presented is formerly the extraordinary, individual genius who is above the law (though of course that figure never entirely disappears). In the later works, he depicted the ordinary sinner who is ready to forgive those who have sinned against him. Blake found in sin, or more precisely, the idea that every-one is equally a sinner, an all-inclusive positive alternative to righteous condemnation that had been missing in his earlier works. Therein lies the crucial difference, that all men are alike insofar as no one can honestly proclaim that he is good and good alone (Everlasting Gospel, E 521), or say, as Tharmas’ Spectre does, "If thou hast sinned & art polluted know that I am pure / And unpolluted & will bring to rigid strict account / All thy past deeds" (Four Zoas 6:10-12, E 303).

We might finally sum up Blake's objections to morality as coming from two different directions and giving voice to two basic concerns. The one has to do with all legal systems from Moses and Plato on down, and that is obvious enough. The other has to do with the fact that individuals and humanity as a whole are being held responsible and condemned not for their behavior, but for their propensities, desires, and virtues. Blake’s insistence that we ought not to define a man's character in terms of either good or evil, that we must stop calumniating against and condemning the virtues of humanity as vicious and sinful, goes to the heart of the problem Christianity bequeathed when it sought to bring psychological states of mind under the rule of moral law. With the very first Christians, the intent and hope most probably were to liberate their people from ritual and law and make the religious life a matter of spiritual enlightenment and refinement, but the outcome among the established churches was to make men and women accountable to others and a dark burden to themselves for their mental, spiritual, and imaginative life.

Blake’s writings seek to recover the initial hopes of primitive Christianity while relieving internal states of consciousness of the moral scrutiny traditional Christianity had subjected them to. How one thinks and feels is nobody’s business but one’s own, and Blake’s business was always to free our mental lives from the accusation of sin. Together with his objections to the Mosaic and other sacred codes, it pretty much covers all that Blake found fundamentally wrong with traditional and conventional morality.
individual rights. Blake thus stood as a key transition figure who drew upon past and present conceptions of liberty that were to become the cornerstones of modern liberal democracies. He called for a society of virtuous men, a society, that is, in which every individual would be free to follow his own conscience—one of universal toleration without martyrdoms, wars, or dominancy, based on the recognition that there can be no single abode of holiness and that every man’s wisdom is peculiar to his individuality. The foundation of this society is not religion, but art and science, and it is to be composed of virtuosi who, to the extent that they do not hinder the acts of others, are free in mind and body to gratify their desires and act upon their leading propensities so that they may give expression to the spirit and genius within each and every one of them.

Works Cited


N E W S L E T T E R

Nelson Hilton joined us as the journal’s first—and only—review editor in 1980. He has been the stalwart and expert editorial companion to us ever since. The pleasure of working alongside Nelson issue after issue, year after year, has been constant, and we will miss him profoundly, although he will continue to offer advice as a member of our advisory board. His excuse for ducking out on us now is, unfortunately, credible, as in addition to developing the University of Georgia’s general composition electronic markup and management application (www.emmalogin.org) and teaching, he is now director of the university’s Center for Teaching and Learning. Nelson concludes, “So, time to shed load—with a big shout-out to the many colleagues who agreed to undertake reviews, the two who long ago imagined a greenhorn as review editor, and all who have made working with BIQ a profound pleasure and liberal education.”

Meanwhile, we are exceedingly proud to welcome as our new review editor Alexander (Sandy) Gourlay, who teaches courses on British literature, art history, and paleography at the Rhode Island School of Design, including an annual seminar on Hogarth and Blake. He has published several articles on Blake and edited Prophetic Character: Essays on William Blake in Honor of John E. Grant. He is working now on a web-based resource for studying Blake’s Night Thoughts watercolors. In his own words, Sandy “aspires in time to live up to the high standard set in this position by Nelson Hilton, and welcomes such encomia, constructive advice, and intemperate abuse as the readership sees fit to impart.”

We anticipate, with great pleasure, years of superior reviewing under Sandy’s leadership.

[Morris Eaves and Morton D. Paley, editors]
Robert Hartley Cromek, who bought William Blake's twenty watercolors for Blair's Grave in the autumn of 1805, was clearly a man of charm, taste, and energy. People readily liked and trusted him; Blake did too. He was also a man of flexible scruples, ready to promise what would serve his commercial purposes. His ilk still flourishes 200 years later.

These twenty watercolors were on unwatermarked paper of various sizes, 10.8 to 23.8 cm. wide by 19.6 to 30.2 cm. high (no two are identical)—seven landscape shape, the rest portrait shape—and mounted (by Cromek?) on stiff brownish paper 33.0 x 26.5 cm.1 watermarked RUSE 1800, J WHATMAN 1801, and J WHATMAN. The variety of papers and sizes may imply that the watercolors were made at different times for different purposes and that Blake had conceived the series before Cromek approached him. The series as it existed in November 1805 is unified by three matching framing lines around the watercolors.2

The twenty drawings Blake sold to Cromek probably consisted of the fifteen listed in Cromek's first prospectus of November 1805 (nos. 14, 3, 18, "The Widow Embracing Her Husband's Grave," 8, 10, 13, 7, 2, 19, "Death Pursuing the Soul," 11, 6, 9, 4 in Sotheby's list) plus five more designs never listed for publication (nos. 5, 12, 15-17). Notice that the title page (no. 1) is not included here.

There are significant discrepancies between the twenty watercolors Blake sold to Cromek in 1805 and the nineteen offered 200 years later at Sotheby's in 2006. "The Widow Embracing Her Husband's Grave," listed in Cromek's first prospectus, did not appear in later descriptions of the series, e.g., the second prospectus, also of November 1805; it was separated from the other watercolors and is first traced in 1876 (Butlin). It is now at Yale.

"Death Pursuing the Soul through the Avenues of Life," listed in the first prospectus, disappears from Cromek's puff thereafter and was separated from the other Grave designs, perhaps because it was thought to be an "Illustration to 'Urim and Zen,'" for so Cromek's son labeled it and Allan Cunningham described it.3 It now belongs to Robert Essick.

The design for the title page, "The Skeleton Re-Animated," does not appear at all in the first prospectus (1805). The design is first named in the Manchester Gazette (7 November 1807), where it is called "A skeleton discovering the first symptoms of re-animation"; it appears there as pl. 7, not as the title page. It is much larger than the other designs (33.2 x 26.5 cm.) and lacks the framing lines which unify the others. Apparently it was created between November 1805 and November 1807: Blake was still on speaking terms with Cromek as late as April 1807, when he offered his design for the dedication (refused with contumely). Perhaps Cromek traded to Blake "The Widow Embracing," which he no longer needed, for "The Skeleton Re-Animated," thus avoiding the need for any tedious transfer of cash. It was apparently only later that "The Skeleton Re-Animated" was adopted for the title page.

Once the watercolors had been engraved, Cromek had no further use for them. In a letter of May 1807 he offered to sell back to Blake "the 12 [watercolors] for 'The Grave' ... on the publication of the poem ... [for] the 20 guineas I have paid you." Had Blake accepted the offer, Cromek would have retained the copyright and the other eight watercolors for nothing.

Blake did not accept the offer, and when Cromek died in March 1812 he left his wife and two children in a somewhat fragile financial situation. On 3 February 1813 a friend offered on Mrs. Cromek's behalf: "Blake's original Designs for Blair's Grave with other curious Drawings of his, valued at thirty Pounds and likely to sell for a great deal more if ever the man should die .... Mrs C. is rather urgent for the disposal of them ...." This offer was not accepted.

Some time after Cromek's death in 1812, the nineteen loose watercolors for Blair's Grave were put in a red morocco portfolio (sold with them in 2006) with a buckle and a stamped label: "DESIGNS FOR | BLAIR'S GRAVE"—the lining paper is watermarked BEILBY & KNOTTS 1821.

The set of Blair watercolors migrated to the collection of Thomas Sivright of Meggetland, for whose estate they were sold at auction by C. B. Tait of Edinburgh on 10 February 1836, lot 1835, as a "Volume of Drawings by Blake, Illustrative of Blair's Grave, entitled 'Black Spirits and White, Blue Spirits and Grey'" (adapted from Macbeth 4.1) for £1.5.0, buyer unknown. This spiritual title is no longer with the watercolors.

The drawings then entered their long sleep of 165 years. Alas! it was not Prince Charming who brought them to life once more.

I thank Robert Essick for his comments on an early draft of this account. I am also much indebted to the bibliographer of Blake/An Illustrated Quarterly (hereafter cited as Blake) for information and organization of bibliographical details and to the author of Blake Records (2004; hereafter BR[2]) for biographical details. Quotations with dates are from BR[2]. "Butlin #" refers to Martin Butlin, The Paintings and Drawings of William Blake (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

1. The title page has no framing lines or mount and is the size of the mounts of the other designs. Pastemarks on the backs of many pages suggest that they were once pasted down. No. 16 is on different paper.

2. "Death Pursuing" (24.7 x 11.4 cm., Butlin #635) was trimmed to the design, probably after 1876 when it was exhibited at the Burlington Fine Arts Club and its dimensions were given as 31.0 x 20.9 cm. Perhaps the trimming removed three framing lines.
During the years of oblivion, the watercolors for Blair's *Grave* were in the Stannard family. They went from John Stannard (1794-1882), watercolor artist of Bedfordshire, to his son Henry John Stannard (1840-1920), watercolor artist, then to John's grandson Henry John Sylvester Stannard (1870-1951), to Henry Lawrence Stannard (1934-2001), and were "given to a relative in 1987" in Glasgow. Apparently over the decades the significance of the drawings was forgotten; after all, if they cost only a little over a shilling apiece in 1836, how important could they be?

In the meantime, the prices of Blake's works leapt upward spectacularly. At a sale at Sotheby's (New York) almost exactly seven years ago, *The First Book of Urizen* copy E "fetched ... over $100,000 per page," a price which created a sensation even beyond the Blake world. Such prices "encouraged folk to hunt out forgotten family treasures" and bring them to the attention of dealers.

At the end of their long sleep, in 2001 Blake's watercolors for Blair's *Grave* were "sold ... as part of a small family library, to Caledonia Books, a general second-hand bookshop in Glasgow ... run by Maureen Smillie" where they were offered at £1,000 as colored engravings—though there are nineteen watercolors, not twelve engravings as in the published versions. Apparently the vendors did not look at the published version, available in editions of 1808, 1813, 1826, 1847, 1870, [21879], 1903, 1906, 1963, 1969, 1973, and 1982.

There the portfolio and watercolors were seen and taken on approval for £1,000 (presumably minus the customary dealer's discount of 20%) by Paul Williams of Fine Books, Ilkley, West Yorkshire, who associated Jeffery Bates of Bates & Hindmarsh, a Leeds bookshop, with the acquisition. They took them for an opinion to Nathan and Dominic Winter of Winter Book Auctions, Swindon, with whom they had dealt before, and the Winters quickly disabused them of the idea that the portfolio contained colored engravings. The Winters consulted Martin Butlin, author of the magisterial catalogue raisonné of Blake's art, formerly of the Tate, and Robin Hamlyn, who is now responsible for the Blakes at the Tate, and were assured that the watercolors were genuine and valuable. Butlin later described them in print as "arguably the most important [Blake discovery] since Blake began to be appreciated in the second half of the nineteenth century."

The discovery of the value of the watercolors seems to have struck Williams dumb—or at least trisyllabic—for the only response he could give to a telephone inquirer was "no comment."

He wished to sell the drawings en bloc, and the Tate, which naturally was deeply interested in them, was given first refusal for six months at a price, it is said, of £2,000,000 (a nice increase from £1,000), later increased to £4,200,000 (plus £700,000 tax). If the drawings could not be sold as a group, they were to be auctioned individually by the Winters in London.

On 17 December 2001 Nathan and Dominic Winter brought the watercolors from a bank vault to the very elegant Regency Room of the Westbury Hotel off Bond Street, so that they could be seen by David Bindman, Robert Essick, Edward Maggs, Rosamund A. Paice, Morton Paley, John Windle, G. E. Bentley, Jr., and E. B. Bentley. All these were immediately impressed by their authenticity, beauty, importance, and commercial value.

For a time the offer to the Tate was suspended while Caledonia Books sued Paul Williams and Jeffery Bates for return of the watercolors and £15,000 damages; on 22 November 2002 the suit was settled out of court (so no public record is available), but the parties are said to have agreed on the sale of the watercolors and the equal division of the proceeds. The speculative buyers, even if they relinquished half of their profits to the Glasgow shop, would have to be content with a gain of only £2,000,000.

As soon as the lawsuit was settled, and before the Tate could act, in December 2002 the London dealer Libby Howie "snuck in and bought them" for about £4,900,000, according to Sir Nicholas Serota, director of the Tate. She gave the impression, at least to Sir Nicholas, that she was buying on behalf of a hitherto unknown private collector who was variously identified as an American with a castle in Scotland who would make them publicly available and "Marburg BV1," a Swiss corporation. The Sotheby's catalogue describes the owner as "a European based private collector." The British reviewing committee on the export of works of art (see below) was told that the "new owner was prepared to allow access to scholars and to consider their eventual exhibition and publication," but we know of no such access or exhibition in the last four years, except for the sale. There is of course a distinction between being "prepared" to do something and doing it.

The export of the drawings was stopped by the British arts minister, Estelle Morris, until 30 May, later extended to 30 September 2005, because of the "serious intention to acquire the paintings by the Tate"; they were valued at £8,800,000 in the reviewing committee report of 16 March 2005. The watercolors were presumably sent to Switzerland, as requested in the application for export.

9. The date is given in the Sotheby's catalogue.
11. According to Bailey, "Dealer's Decision to Break Up William Blake Album Branded 'philistine,'" *Art Newspaper* online, 16 March 2006, this is "a family trust registered in the British Virgin Islands and ... the Blakes were to be delivered to the freepost at Geneva airport."
The discovery, and particularly the export ban, generated very wide publicity in journals and newspapers from London to Winston-Salem and Kansas City and Kerala. Most of the authors were anonymous, but those named included Alexander Gourlay and Martin Butlin.¹²

However, it later appeared that Howie had bought them as a commercial speculation for a conglom of investors not necessarily interested in art. She attempted to find a buyer for several years before concluding "that no museum would be interested in buying the set" (Vogel, "Art Experts"). This is a Cromek-like statement, since the Tate was attempting to raise money when she abruptly bought them.

Eventually they were offered at Sotheby's in New York on 2 May 2006, a sale in which the watercolors for Blair's Grave were the only works on offer. To stimulate interest, they were exhibited in London, Paris, Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York, but the Los Angeles exhibition (the only one about which I have information) was sparsely attended. The target, of course, was not the many-headed public, but serious collectors, such as Alan Parker in London, the Amis du Louvre in Paris, Robert Essick in Los Angeles, the Rothmans in Chicago, and Maurice Sendak in New York.

The catalogue itself is very handsome, a collector's treasure, with printing in red and black, color reproductions of all the lots for sale, half of them "actual size," and hard covers imitating the portfolio in which the drawings were found. The catalogue, by Nancy Bialler, is also remarkably responsible, partly because of the assistance throughout of Robert Essick, with reproductions of the more important of the analogous drawings and a careful history of the enterprise. It must be unusual for one of the auction-catalogue contributors to be an eager bidder for what is described.

The prices asked for the set of drawings have leapfrogged dramatically:

- £21 for 20 drawings bought by Cromek in November 1805
- £20 for 12 drawings offered to Blake by Cromek in May 1807
- £1.5.0 for 19 drawings sold for Thomas Sivright in 1836
- £1,000 for 19 watercolors (understood to be colored engravings) by Caledonia Bookshop, Glasgow, 2001
- £,2,000,000 first refusal offered by Paul Williams to the Tate, later raised to £4,200,000
- £2,660,000 January 2002
- £3,000,000 to £4,000,000 asking price in February 2002
- £4,900,000 the price for which Libby Howie is believed to have bought the set
- £8,800,000 estimate in the reviewing committee report for 16 March 2005¹³
- US $20,000,000 the price at which Libby Howie was offering the set to possible buyers
- US $12,000,000 to $17,500,000 minimum and maximum estimates at the Sotheby’s sale

US $6,180,000 amount for which 11 watercolors sold at the sale—8 watercolors unsold

Before the sale, possible bidders for individual watercolors included the anonymous US owners of America (R), Book of Thel (H), First Book of Urizen (E), Songs of Innocence (H, N), and Songs of Innocence and of Experience (D), and other works (already contacted by Libby Howie about buying the whole collection); Leon Black, who has two splendid Blake watercolors; Robert Essick, whose major Blake collection includes two other watercolors for Blair’s Grave, "Death Pursuing" (Butlin #635) and "Churchyard Spectres" (Butlin #342); the J. Paul Getty Museum of Los Angeles; the Huntington Library, the most important public Blake repository west of the Mississippi, perhaps in association with the Getty Museum; Alan Parker, owner of the Large Blake-Varley Sketchbook and the Bunyan watercolors, and other works; Maurice Sendak, owner of The First Book of Urizen pl. 3, Songs of Innocence (J), Songs of innocence and of Experience (H), Hayley, Ballads (1805) colored, Hayley, "Little Tom," colored, and other works; Tate Britain, the most important collection of Blake’s art; John Windle, the chief dealer in Blake books and drawings for several years; the Wormsley Library of the late Sir Paul Getty; the Yale Centre for British Art, which owns a watercolor for The Grave and a major collection of Blake’s works in illuminated printing, and other works.

The chief public repositories of Blake’s drawings and paintings—the British Museum Department of Prints and Drawings, the Fitzwilliam Museum, the Huntington Library, the US National Gallery, and Tate Britain—have not purchased expensive Blake pictures for some time, but it was possible that one of their benefactors might be interested, such as Eugene V. and Clare E. Thaw, whose important “Christ Nailed to the Cross" by Blake is on deposit at and promised to the Pierpont Morgan Library.

The separation of the set of watercolors is a major cultural disaster.¹⁴ Martin Butlin said quite accurately that the breakup of the set would be "absolutely philistine" (Vogel, "Art Experts"). The argument that, because one of the watercolors is now at Yale, the set is already broken up and can appropriately be sold piecemeal "is nonsense;" "This is an auction that should not take place."¹⁵

For one thing, some of the nineteen watercolors are likely to return to the obivion from which they suffered for 165...
years. For another, when they are scattered it will no longer be possible to compare the original drawings directly with one another. The paper and dimensions and watermarks can of course be recorded, but it will be exceedingly difficult to ascertain whether, say, the blue in one watercolor is exactly the same as that in another watercolor. Martin Butlin's observation that the watercolors which were engraved seem to be more sun-faded than the ones never engraved will be almost impossible to make with confidence when the drawings are widely dispersed.

An analogous situation occurred thirty years ago with The Book of Urizen—and with a very different result. About 1956 Paul Mellon bought Urizen copy A with twenty-eight plates. Then, in 1971, copy C with twenty-six plates was sold for £24,000 and acquired by a consortium headed by Mellon's occasional agent John Baskett. When the consortium found that they could not sell Urizen (C) at a thumping profit as readily as they had hoped, they let it be known that they would sell the twenty-six plates separately, as the copy was "incomplete," "missing" two plates. Faced with this threat, Mellon bought Urizen copy C in 1972, thus becoming the only collector in history to own two of the eight copies of Urizen. Alas, all the knights in shining armor in 2006 seem to have shallow pockets.

Sotheby's New York is now in a building at least ten stories high with whole floors devoted to particular genres; the Blake watercolors were exhibited on the floor with impressionists, post-impressionists, and modern art. On the same floor were Renoirs, Matisses, Chagalls, and Picassos, with massive Maillol statues of clothless females here and there, enough to make famous a museum anywhere in the world. The lighting and setting were superb. The attendants were suited men armed only with discreet lapel buttons.

At a private viewing before the sale, arranged by Robert Essick, it became clear that the fine catalogue reproductions were not good enough. The glossy coated faintly-peach-colored paper falsifies the effect significantly, the colors of the originals are generally darker, and there was a consistent mudding of the delicate watercolors. Joseph Viscomi assiduously recorded the color shifts so that he could adjust the reproductions which will be used in the William Blake Archive.

The drawings are breathtaking, with many details which are barely detectable in the reproductions, such as a crease across "The Grave Personified" and the fact that in "The Soul Hovering over the Body" the eyes of the corpse are still perceptibly open.

At a cheerful, bibulous wake of Blake lovers to say goodbye at the graveside for perhaps the last time that the drawings will be visible in their integrity, a sweepstake was organized estimating the total which the drawings would realize at the sale the next day. The participants consisted of scholars (David Bindman, Morris Eaves, Robert Essick, Alexander Gourlay, John Grant, Mary Lynn Johnson, Joseph Viscomi, and Bentley and Bentley), most of whom (save for Bindman and Essick) were pretty innocent of commercial expertise. There were also nervous collectors (Essick, Roger Lipman, Alan Parker), who were dauntingly canny, a dealer (John Windle, who declined to participate on the ground that it would constitute insider trading), an editor (Sarah Jones), and their partners. The estimates ranged from $7,300,000 to $16,900,000, and the irrelevance of extensive knowledge of the subject was vividly demonstrated by the fact that the most accurate estimate ($7,300,000) was made not by a scholar or a collector or an editor but by Maria Fernandez, Viscomi's partner.

The room in which the auction was held was, by comparison with Sotheby's discreet splendors elsewhere, poky and spartan. There were perhaps 150 bidders and spectators on the floor, with perhaps a score standing against the wall at the side. On the banks of telephones and computers and generally standing by were at least twenty more Sotheby's employees.

Prices at auction are affected by such factors as whether the design was engraved and therefore very well known, by publicity such as exhibiting the watercolors in London, Paris, New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago and the press stories of the export ban and indignation at breaking up the set, by the extent of the coloring (nos. 1, 13, 18, 19 are only slightly colored), by the novelty of the design—some of the unengraved watercolors are familiar from preliminary studies (e.g., nos. 12 and 15) or from use of the same design for other purposes (e.g., nos. 15 and 16)—by who is bidding—only the more prosperous kind of millionaire can effectively bid against another eager millionaire—and by the design's meaning, effectiveness, and beauty.

The sale began promptly at 10:15 am and finished by 11:20. The auctioneer was very professional, firm, precise, and cool, though not chummy. The Blake contingent mostly sat about the third row, which was a mistake, because it's very difficult to see from there who is bidding.

Bearing such conditions in mind, the prices estimated and realized at the Sotheby's sale are listed in the table on the following page.

The competition began briskly, with twenty-nine bids for no. 1, the title page, running the price from $100,000 to $650,000, $390,000 above the estimate, a price which more than one witness found "astounding." Lot 2 went from $140,000 to $500,000 in twenty-four bids, also above the higher estimate. For the rest of the lots, however, there were only six or seven bids.

The value of the watercolors was seriously overestimated. Despite the drumbeat of publicity and discreet inquiries and exhibitions, fourteen of the watercolors did not reach the lower estimate (nos. 4-5, 7-18), and of these eight were bought in to what must have been the disappointment of the sellers. Two went within their estimates (nos. 3 and 6), and three fetched more than their higher estimates (nos. 1-2, 19).

16. The buyers came from each of these cities.
Of course, these figures do not mean what they appear to mean. The purchaser pays to Sotheby's a "buyer's premium" of 20% on bids up to $200,000 "and 12% on any amount in excess of $200,000." The purchaser also pays a New York tax (8.375%) or a variable "compensating use tax of another state" (about 6%). Purchasers who use an agent will have an agent's fee of perhaps 10%. Thus, a hammer price of $200,000 might represent a cost to the purchaser of $280,000. The vendor pays a negotiable fee to Sotheby's, plus the costs of reproductions in the catalogue (fifty-one here) and of exhibiting the works. Of the anonymous buyers, those who secured nos. 1, 3, and 6 were bidding by phone. (One wonders whether all the bidders had seen the originals; at least one had not.) The anonymous man in a bow tie who bought nos. 15 and 17 was, John Windle thinks, a curator or a dealer. Hinrich Sieveking, from Munich, says that he is merely an agent for the owner. Jessie Price (Mrs. H. Charles Price) from Dallas, who obtained "the woman with the wings," like Sieveking and the Louvre, had apparently never bought a Blake before, and they were therefore unknown quantities in the pre-sale speculation. The Rothmans had rarely appeared on the floor before when purchasing Blakes. John Windle bought for stock the portfolio in which the drawings were found.

When one buys something at a merely high price, one can simply put it in one's pocket and walk out of the room with it, as I did when John Windle bought Marriage (M) for me at Christie's London in 1997 for £9,000. At the altitudinous level of the Blair watercolors, however, life is not so straightforward. The new owners of the Grave designs had to wait for a fortnight while checks were deposited and cleared. Collecting your purchase is simpler in the financial slums.

18. All figures are in thousands of US dollars.
19. For another list of the buyers, see Bailey and Adam.
20. Melikian, "Louvre Leads Bidding" ("a private group of benefactors, including the Société des Amis du Louvre and a collector, Antoine Prat" paid $1,680,000 [including the buyer's premium] at Sotheby's [for "Death of the Strong Wicked Man"]').
21. That is, it did not meet the unpublished reserve price and was not sold.
In 2006 the vendors of the nineteen Grave watercolors sold eleven of them, plus the portfolio, for $6,184,200 ($7,102,640 including the premiums), which is about what they are believed to have paid for them in 2002, viz. £4,900,000. They still have eight watercolors, for which $4,810,000 was offered and rejected at the 2006 sale.22

But let us keep this in perspective. Such prices are small potatoes compared to $2,500,000 paid for a Chagall and $5,000,000 for a Monet, not to mention $95,000,000 for Picasso’s “Dora Maar with a Cat,” which were exhibited on the same floor with the Blakes and were sold the next day for these obscene prices to a previously unknown, Russian-accented buyer frantically waving his paddle at the very back of the room.23 The amount by which the Picasso exceeded its low estimate, $44,000,000, was about six times what the entire Blake sale brought. But some of us prefer small potatoes.

This is heady, glamorous stuff, mink coats and Bentleys. No Blake collection of watercolors has ever reached such prices. After the sale, triumphant bidders and awestruck observers gathered very agreeably at the back of the hall for “gosh” and “who was the bidder in the bow tie?” (one of them was John Windle). To the delight of several of us, the Rothmans willingly joined the group. Noel Rothman said to Jerry, “I don’t understand the fuss about the breakup of the collection; any real collector will surely show his treasures to any seriously interested scholar.” Amen!

It has been a wonderful privilege and joy to see Blake’s watercolors for Blair’s Grave on two occasions. What treasure will emerge from the shadows next?

22. A week after the sale, a London dealer with impressive contacts reported that all the Blair watercolors bought in had been sold. According to another report, “The Day of Judgment,” “Death’s Door,” and “The Soul Hovering over the Body” were sold after the auction, and lots 5, 8, and 12-14 were returned to Libby Howie. Sotheby’s did not respond to our written queries as to what became of the watercolors which were bought in.


1. (left) “Christ Descending into the Grave,” a benign, muscled figure carrying the keys of Hell and Death, sold for $280,000 to a private collector. It was engraved for the 1808 edition of The Grave. Photo courtesy of Sotheby’s New York.

2. (below) “Our Time Is Fix’d, and All Our Days Are Number’d,” sold for $270,000 to an anonymous purchaser. The female figures with flowing draperies floating contextlessly in air are remarkably like the apsaras of Buddhist iconography, found for instance in the Tang Dynasty frescoes in the Thousand Buddhas Caves of Dun Huang in the Gobi Desert. The design was unknown until 2001. Photo courtesy of Sotheby’s New York.
William Blake and the Age of Revolution:
The Interdisciplinary Blake MA Course,
Centre for Eighteenth Century Studies,
University of York, 1998-2004

An Appreciation, Checklist of
Dissertations and Publications

BY MARK CROSBY, TROY PATENAUDE,
AND ANGUS WHITEHEAD

I
n 1998 John Barrell, director of the Centre for Eighteenth
Century Studies at the University of York, invited Michael
Phillips to design and teach a one-year interdisciplinary MA
in English and History of Art devoted to the life and work
of William Blake. The course, William Blake and the Age of
Revolution, was first convened in October 1999. Michael's
hands-on investigations into Blake's printmaking methods
and research into the creation of the Songs of Innocence and
of Experience and Blake's life in Lambeth during the 1790s
focused the course sharply upon how the illuminated books
were produced in their immediate biographical and historical
contexts.

During the first term, we concentrated on Songs of Inno-
cence and Songs of Experience. This involved exploring
the conception and evolution in manuscript of Blake's poems
designs and the development and mastery of the method
he used to reproduce them in "Illuminated Printing." In the
second term, we explored Blake's life and work in Lambeth
during the first half of the 1790s, situating him in a detailed
historical context. One seminar, composed of a multimedia
presentation detailing Michael's reconstruction of Blake's resi-
dence, studio and neighborhood in Lambeth, had a profound
influence on several students' methodologies and the topics
they later researched for their dissertations.

From the beginning, emphasis was also placed upon in-
roducing students to museums, galleries and libraries in
preparation for primary archival research. With some varia-
tion from year to year, these included the National Archives
(PRO), British Library, British Museum Department of Prints
and Drawings, Lambeth Archive, City of Westminster Ar-
chives Centre, London Metropolitan Archive, St. Bride Print-
ing Library, Tate Britain, the Fitzwilliam Museum, Glasgow
University Library, Hunterian Art Gallery, the Edinburgh
Printmaker's Workshop and the Black Star Press. These field
trips soon paid dividends, providing a unique opportunity
to examine original materials firsthand, including Blake's man-
uscript Notebook and the manuscript of Vala or The Four
Zounds, multiple copies of the illuminated books and separate
prints, as well as manuscript and printed materials relating
to the topographical, political and cultural contexts of Blake's
life and work. Several students vividly recall how, one bright
December morning in Cambridge, there was a dazzling effect
of sunlight reflecting off the gold material Blake used to fin-
ish each plate of the King's College copy of Songs of Innocence
and of Experience; others remember the visit to the National
Archives at Kew and inspecting the huge folio register of po-
litical prisoners in Newgate 1792-95.

One of the most valuable aspects of the course was our
exposure to the practicalities of printmaking and eight-
teenth-century book production. During the initial years of
the course, Michael provided demonstrations at York in an
improvised printing studio at the King's Manor. These were
conducted using his own facsimile relief-etched copperplates
of the Songs and America and an extremely rare nineteenth-
century star-wheel rolling press. In later years, when the press
was no longer available, students traveled north to Scotland
where Michael conducted similar printmaking sessions at the
professional Edinburgh Printmaker's Workshop. These were
unique, valuable, and at times frustrating experiences, high-
lighting the care and, more importantly, the time required
to ink a shallow relief-etched plate in order to obtain even
a relatively clean print.\(^2\) The sessions complemented demon-
strations and discussions with other experts in intaglio and
letterpress printing.

A day was spent engraving, inking and printing intaglio cop-
perplates with Anthony Dyson, professional printmaker, at his
Black Star printmaking studio in Teddington. We enjoyed an
afternoon in Soho with the eighteenth-century print dealer
Andrew Edmunds, where we examined his extensive collec-
tion of James Gillray and other political caricatures. We also
spent a day with Nigel Roche, a repository of knowledge con-
cerning print culture in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries and curator of the St. Bride Printing Library and
Museum off Fleet Street, who instructed us in printing from
letterpress on a seventeenth-century wooden screw press. Da-
vid Alexander provided valuable insights on Blake's appren-
ticeship and later career in the context of contemporary fash-
ions in printmaking. Exposure to these experts, grounding us
in different forms of print culture, was exciting, informative
and inspiring.

At conferences Michael ensured that students met and
talked with such major Blake scholars as Martin Butlin, Mor-
ton Paley, Detlef Dörrebecker, David Worrall and Keri Davies.
During research trips students also encountered important
academics in the field of art history, paper conservators such
as Rebecca Donnan, Joyce Townsend, the senior conservation
scientist at Tate Britain, and Stephen Lloyd, senior curator at

1. The authors wish to thank Clare Bond, secretary for the Centre for
Eighteenth Century Studies, University of York, for her assistance with
this note.

2. See Michael Phillips, "The Printing of Blake's America a Prophecy."
the National Portrait Gallery of Scotland. Meeting specialists in the fields of paper conservation, miniatures, and painting materials further enhanced our understanding of Blake's life, works, use of artistic techniques, choice of pigments, medium and media in the creation of his illuminated books and separate prints.

From this solid theoretical and practical preparation, Michael encouraged students to make original choices in selecting the works and contexts they wished to explore in their two major essays and 15-20,000 word dissertation. The diversity and originality of the students' choices are apparent in the titles of the dissertations listed below. William Blake and the Age of Revolution was also very popular with students as an optional module, where they would attend the course in either the first or the second term, and attracted students from the Continent and America as well as from Britain. As external assessor and examiner of the course, Andrew Lincoln, of Queen Mary College, University of London, generously gave of his time in writing reports on our essays and dissertations. On completing the course, five students went on to pursue doctoral studies in England or North America. A number of other students took up professional positions often not unrelated to their area of study, such as editor of children's literature at the Cambridge University Press and associate editor of renaissance and eighteenth-century literature at the Arden Press and subsequently Oxford University Press.

However, due to the small numbers of students taking the MA, it was decided that it should cease to be offered from the end of September 2004. The disappearance of this unique course has left a substantial gap in postgraduate Blake studies. At present, we understand that no other academic establishment offers a comparable interdisciplinary master's degree course. It is to be hoped that a similar course may be convened elsewhere.

MA Dissertations:

2000:
Bethan Stevens. "Blake's Woodcut Illustrations: A Breach with Convention?"

2001:
Rebecca Minnitt. "Words of Instruction, Songs of Innocence: Blake, Wollstonecraft and Children's Literature."
Charlotte Carroll. "The Small and Large Books of Designs: Their Production and the Aspiration They Inspired." 2003:
Angus Whitehead. "My present precincts': A Recreation and Exploration of the Last Living and Working Space of William Blake: 3 Fountain Court, Strand, 1821-1827." 2003:
Heather Milan. "A Study of the Public Identity of Maria Cosway between 1781 and 1789, Her Most Productive Period."

PhD Thesis:

Publications:


Bethan Stevens, during 2004, compiled computer catalogue entries for the Blake collection of prints in the British Museum Department of Prints and Drawings, amounting to over 1,000 entries. (Entries for the collection of nearly 400 drawings had been completed previously.) The catalogue is currently available only at the museum, but will go online in two or three years' time. Based upon the collection, her introductory book, William Blake, was published by British Museum Press, October 2005.

Angus Whitehead. "'William Blocke': New References to Blake in Boyle's City Guide (1797) and Boyle's City Companion (1798)." Blake Journal 8 (2004): 30-46.
---. "'I also beg Mr Blakes acceptance of my wearing apparel': The Will of Henry Banes, Landlord of 3 Fountain Court, Strand, the Last Residence of William and Catherine Blake." Blake/An Illustrated Quarterly 39.2 (fall 2005): 78-99.
---. "New Information Concerning Mrs Enoch, William and Catherine Blake's 'Fellow Inhabitant' at 17 South Molton Street." Notes and Queries ns 52.4 (December 2005): 460-63.
---. "'This extraordinary performance': William Blake's Use of Gold, Silver and Other Metals in the Creation of His Paintings and Illuminated Books and a Possible Source of Blake's Metal c. 1821-27." Blake/An Illustrated Quarterly (forthcoming).
---. "Visions of Blake, the Artist': An Early Reference to William Blake in the Times." Blake/An Illustrated Quarterly (forthcoming).

74 Blake/An Illustrated Quarterly

Fall 2006

Reviewed by Eugenie R. Freed

My bones trembled. I fell outstretched upon the path
A moment, & my Soul return’d into its mortal state
And my sweet Shadow of Delight stood trembling by my side.
William Blake, Milton 42[49]:25-28 (E 143)

It's taken over two centuries, but at last Catherine Blake has emerged from the shadow of her husband’s visionary anguish, moved into the light, and stopped trembling.

Janet Warner has written a novel about Catherine and her husband that will charm and beguile any reader—but those who already have some awareness of Blake's works, and of the social and intellectual environment in which they came into being, will especially appreciate what Warner has achieved in her fictionalized account of “the Marriage of Catherine Sophia Boucher and William Blake.” Substantial historical and literary scholarship form the solid base upon which this version of their union is constructed, and the structure itself is a bravura performance.

It’s a truism that no one outside of the partners involved can ever really get to know what goes on in a relationship. By giving Catherine the principal narrative voice and point of view throughout, Warner gives the reader access to the most intimate aspects of the marriage. Most of the story is told in the first person. We see events largely through the striking black eyes of Kate—as her husband always called her—and walk in her well-worn shoes through many of the landmarks of her fascinating life experience. Occasionally a letter written by Frederick Tatham appears, or an excerpt from his journal; there are many of Blake's own letters, others from Mary Wollstonecraft, William Hayley, Fuseli; there is an extract from the journal of the publisher Joseph Johnson, and some notes made by “Mrs. Sarah Goodhouse,” a midwife. Fact, probability, possibility, and fiction, mingle harmoniously and inextricably.

The novel begins two years after William Blake has entered Eternity for the last time. His widow has taken up residence in the home of Frederick Tatham, formerly one of the Ancients—-the small circle of young artist-disciples who attached themselves devotedly to Blake in his last years. Kate has become housekeeper to Frederick and his wife Maria, both of whom treat her with respect and affection—though there have already been some serious disputes over the disposition of her husband's works, and Tatham is showing ominous signs of the religious fanaticism that was later to persuade him that Blake was inspired “by Satan himself.”

Tatham has set himself to compile “a Life of this extraordinary Man, whose Art is as Sublime as his Poetry Obscure” (3), and is determined to obtain whatever information he can from Blake's “devoted Companion in Life” (3).

Kate consults in this matter with William, who comes to her every night, without fail, sits in the chair by her bed, and “tells [her] what to do” (4). William gives his approval to Tatham's biographical project, but Kate ponders: “Shall I tell him about my true struggle, about my Jealousy of William, about my temptations and deceptions?” (6). Though there are “some things I cannot tell Mr. Tatham, things I did not tell even William” (13), she decides to speak out, praying to the Lord to guide her “through the terrors of Memory” (6). And so begins Kate's account of her life. She records in a (fictional) notebook her thoughts, experiences and reminiscences, not all of which will be conveyed to Tatham.

The Catherine Blake who makes herself known in this work is by no means the idealized Miltonic Eve, “[worshipping] God in her Husband,” whom Crabb Robinson described. Though she consciously dedicates herself to her “Object” of being “William’s Helpmate. Handmaid to the Visions” (89), Warner's Kate is a woman of strong character with a will of her own. Catherine is indeed a “sincere believer in all [Blake's] visions,” but far from being (as Blake's lifelong friend George Cumberland implied) the victim of folie a deux; she herself,

1. "... a tiny but expanding circle of young admirers who called themselves, in mockery of their extreme youth, 'The Ancients' and Blake's humble walk-up flat 'The House of the Interpreter.'" Bentley, Stranger 363.

2. Referring to the conflict between Catherine Blake and Frederick Tatham, the art dealer Joseph Hogarth noted in his copy of J.T. Smith's life of Blake that "Mrs Blake was hardly the passive creature here described —at all events Tatham did not find her so ..." BR 374.

3. Anne Gilchrist, quoted in BR 418. Gilchrist reported that after Catherine's death Tatham, by then "a zealous Irvingite" (BR 418), "enacted [a] holocaust of Blake manuscripts" (BR 417n3). The son of Edward Calvert, another of the former "Ancients," recorded his father's plea to Tatham to spare Blake's "precious work," adding that "Tatham nevertheless destroyed "blocks, plates, drawings, and MSS. ..." (BR 417n3).

4. An article published in the Monthly Magazine in 1833, about eighteen months after Catherine's death, records her assertion that her late husband "used to come and sit with her two or three hours every day." BR 373.

5. After visiting the Blakes in December 1825, Robinson noted that Catherine possessed "that virtue of virtues in a wife[,] an implicit reverence of her husband. ... She was formed on the Miltonic model—And like the first Wife Eve worshipped God in her Husband—He being to her what God was to him." BR 542-43.

6. Seymour Kirkup, letter to Lord Houghton, 25 March 1870. Kirkup met the Blakes periodically at the home of Thomas Butt's between about 1810 and 1816. BR 221. Robinson made the same observation (BR 542).

7. Commenting laconically on his son's account of a visit to Blake and his wife in 1815, during which, young Cumberland wrote, both husband and wife had expressed inflammatory political sentiments, George Cumberland replied: "... [Blake] is a little Cracked, but very honest—as to his wife she is the maddest of the Two ...." Bentley, Stranger 355-56.
like the man she marries, has always had an easy intercourse with the "Spiritual World" (E 702). "My Voices ... have spoken to me all my life, even before I met William, who had his own Voices and Visions. Later I came to see his Visions, too—but I always had my own" (7).

At the same time, this visionary Kate understands that "it is everyday life that keeps one in good Sense" (221). She is as practical as her husband is otherworldly. Kate cooks, bakes bread, cleans, sews her husband's shirts, tidies his workplace, is pleasant to customers, and handles the couple's finances — when they have money. Her husband teaches her to read, write and draw, and she learns how to print and color his designs, as well as sharing the visions that give rise to them. In this fictional version, as quite evidently in real life, Kate has truly earned her husband's deathbed tribute, "you have ever been an angel to me" (355).

Kate's meeting with William, in the summer of her twentieth year, had been prophesied by her voices. She knows at first sight that she will marry him, for "My Voices are never wrong" (7). Their courtship is brief: Kate "knew instinctively not to play Courtship games with William. I let him see me naked that summer ... [and] I saw him naked, too" (7). They exchange confidences about his visions and her voices. William's parents, "Dissenters, and very pious" (19), are critical of Kate—the daughter of a market gardener—because they believe that their son is "marrying below his station" (24). A special bond exists between William and his ailing youngest brother, Robert, one which is to endure long after Robert's early death. William says earnestly to Kate: "If you love me, you must love Bob" (20). She promises she will.

That was a time, Kate recalls ruefully, when she "would have promised him the moon" (24). William offers her a quatrain:

He who binds to himself a joy
Doth the winged life destroy
But he who kisses the joy as it flies
Lives in Eternity's sun rise. (23, E 474)

Kate accepts, hesitantly, the promise her husband-to-be offers: "Our love is deep enough to include others. We will never be jealous of each other" (23). In her heart, she hopes "never to be put to the test" (24); but tested she is, again and again, after their marriage. William and Catherine are essentially a devoted couple; their sex life (vividly described) is active, varied and exciting, and always a source of inspiration in William's work. Nevertheless, Kate's jealousy of her husband's relationships with other women becomes a significant strand of conflict in the marriage that is never fully resolved.

Kate becomes insanely jealous of Nancy Flaxman, wife of Blake's great friend, the sculptor John Flaxman. Later, she "[watches] with a sick heart" (108) whenever she sees William in conversation with the writer Mary Wollstonecraft. In the latter situation, Kate eventually resolves her jealousy by unselfishly announcing to William, in the presence of Mary and her (married) lover Fuseli, "You must take [Mary] to be your Wife ... and I will be Housekeeper to you both" (123). The fortunate outcome is that "Just the idea that I would not stand in his way should he want to was enough to keep him from doing it" (125). Thereafter harmony is restored between the Blakes; Kate and Mary become close friends, and Kate is as profoundly affected as William by Mary's sad life and her tragic death of "childbed fever": "What a terrible waste, I thought. A beautiful, brilliant woman ... whose whole life has been devoted to the improvement of the lot of women, and she is dying of a disease only women can get" (234).

Kate herself, barren for the first five years of their marriage, falls pregnant at last, but the longed-for baby girl dies during a breech delivery. Kate turns her face to the wall in sorrow and does not speak for over two months. She looks at her reflection in the glass, and thinks: "I see a woman ... flat as earth .... Her face is smooth, even pretty. No one knows she died" (115). William's grief expresses itself by transforming the loss of their infant daughter into The Book of Thebl. It is only when William takes ill that Kate, out of her concern for him, speaks to him and returns to the stream of life.

Most of all Kate resents her husband's obvious interest in the singer Elizabeth Billington, their neighbor in Poland Street. In the novel, it seems that Blake actually does have an affair with "the Polランド Street Man-Trap" (106), a voluptuous golden-haired siren who dresses in sprigged muslin "with a neckline so low you could see her pink nipples" (131). The situation becomes farcical when Elizabeth's husband challenges William to a duel (fortunately averted). In response to Kate's bitter recriminations, William groans: "When I first married you ... I thought that you would love my loves and joy in my delights .... Now you are terrible in jealousy and unlovely in my sight!" (187). At one point she is angry enough to "[banish] him from my bed" (145), though their productive working collaboration during the day continues unabated.

It is during this period of marital standoff, in the summer of 1792, that Mary Wollstonecraft invites Kate to travel with her...

8. These are given as Blake's actual words in J. T. Smith, Nollekens and His Times (1828). BR 471.
9. In a letter of condolence to William Hayley on the death of his son in 1800, Blake wrote: "Thirteen years ago, I lost a brother & with his spirit I converse daily & hourly in the Spirit ... & even now write from his Dictate ..." (E 705). Blake demonstrated this in Milton: on plates 29 and 33 "William" and "Robert" simultaneously receive Milton's inspiration, in the form of a falling star, in mirror-imaged poses.

10. There is no record of Catherine's having had a child, but S. Foster Damon suggested that The Book of Thebl might have been composed after Catherine had given birth to a stillborn girl, and may be "an elegy to the Blakes' dead daughter, their only offspring" (401).

11. The Blakes lived at 28 Poland Street from 1785 until their move to Lambeth in 1790. BR 558-60. Commentators have surmised, from the internal evidence of Blake's poetry of the later 1780s and/or 1790s, that he had an extramarital affair at some time during that period, but no external evidence has appeared. Elizabeth Billington lived (with her husband James) at 54 Poland Street, but — Warner explains—"There is no record that she ever met the Blakes, though they did live on the same street" (366).

to France. Kate resolves to go. William, like any conventional husband, is "aghast" (150) at her decision to leave him, even for a short time, but Kate is determined. As it turns out, the (fictional) journey has to be aborted just prior to the party's planned departure from England, but before that happens, Kate has a significant encounter at the inn at Dover where they spend the night. She meets Paul-Marc Philipon, a handsome young Parisian engraver who is on his way to London to seek employment there and to raise funds for the Girondins in France. He is attracted to Kate, and she to him—but in her bedroom at the inn, at le moment critique, her husband appears to her in a vision, and she turns the would-be lover away. Le moment has passed, but the affair is not over. Paul-Marc finds employment with William in London, and Kate has to face up to certain facts. First, what she feels for Paul-Marc is a "real Affection" (174); and then, "I had become lonely in my marriage. William spent much of his time in the company of his Imagination, or hard at work. ... Paul-Marc provided me with the companionship that had faded from my marriage" (177). This intense, sensitive young Frenchman (with whom William's spinster sister is also in love) takes a convoluted course through the novel. At first Kate holds off from yielding herself to him, but eventually, when William has infuriated her by resuming his affair with Elizabeth Billington after that lady's return from a sojourn in Italy, Kate and Paul-Marc do become lovers. Like the fellowship that develops in the novel between Kate and Mary Wollstonecraft, the "imagined" (370) affair with Paul-Marc rings true as a possibility for the strong and passionate Catherine of this novel. So, too, do other potential entanglements. The historical Kate was beautiful as a young woman—Crabb Robinson, meeting her when she was in her sixties, commented on her "dark eye ... [and the] remains of beauty, and suggests that she model for the artist George Romney: "I felt Mr. Hayley's deep-set eyes on my bosom and waist, and divined his thought" (133). Years later, when the Blakes make their epochal move to Felpham to live and work under Hayley's patronage, his familiarity towards Kate becomes blatant.

The historical Hayley described Catherine as "an excellent Wife ... who shares [Blake's] Labours and his Talents," "perhaps the only female on Earth, who could have suited Him exactly," and rhapsodized to his friend Lady Hesketh that William and Catherine "are as fond of each other, as if their Honey Moon were still shining ... [she is] so truly the Half of her good Man, that they seem animated by one Soul." This fictional Kate admits to herself that she is "rather flattered" (275) by Hayley's attentions, "at my age" (289), though aware that his overtures are becoming "reckless, too familiar" (285). The inevitable dénouement comes when Hayley decides to "try his hand at drawing" (288), and persuades Kate to model for him.

Reflecting "on [her] behaviour with Hayley and William's response" (289), Kate concludes that "it marked an important milestone in our Marriage. It was as if we acknowledged the Struggle between us" (289). Kate admits to herself that by flirting with Hayley she had wanted to make William jealous, as he had made her in the past. But now she seems to hear the ghost of the departed Mary Wollstonecraft, whispering "You are a Person in your own right, Catherine Blake ... is that really the way to make him respect your mind and Female Being? Is Lust the only Weapon you have!" (290).

The marriage is put to the test again shortly after this when Paul-Marc resurfaces, cast adrift in nearby Chichester. He begs Kate to leave her husband and come away with him. To her own surprise, she refuses. "I am William Blake's wife, and can belong to no one else after all these years" (297).

An even more severe trial looms ahead for both the Blakes when the drunken trooper Schofield blunders into their garden in Felpham. In the celebrated aftermath to this encounter, William and Catherine Blake return to London, sick at heart, with the prospect of a court case before them. When the time comes for William's court appearance in Chichester, Kate is too ill to travel with him. Receiving the joyful news that William has been acquitted, Kate reflects upon her own feelings in the matter:

In every marriage, there is one who plays the Martyr ... the one who slaves away to please the other, who tries to cater to every whim, and then resents it ... and ever so often does something destructive to lash out. ... Even my Illness, preventing me from attending the Trial, was a way of punishing William. (323)

13. Seymour Kirkup noted one of Catherine's very few recorded utterances: her complaint that she had "very little of Mr. Blake's company; he is always in Paradise." BR 221.
14. BR 542.
While tidying William's worktable in readiness for his return, she finds and reads a fair copy of *Auguries of Innocence*. This poem, "full of wisdom and feeling and brilliance" (326), leaves her with the hope that she and William may "overcome our difficulties, and forgive each other as Human Beings" (326). Her relationship with Hayley, "a pillar of strength to us both" (302) throughout their ordeal, is now resolved into friendship.

The Blakes' visit together to the art exhibition at the gallery of Count Truchsess, in October 1804, is a landmark in the slow healing process in their marriage. On their return to the apartment in South Molton Street, Kate shares with William a transcendent vision in which his Spectre appears to him—and he is able heroically to embrace this "dark self" (332). Then, looking at his wife "with awe and love" (332), he embraces her.

O Glory! And O Delight! I have entirely reduced that spectrous Fiend to his station, whose annoyance has been the ruin of my labours for the last past twenty years of my life. He is the enemy of conjugal love .... I was a slave bound in a mill among beasts and devils ... [but now] my feet and my wife's feet are free from fetters. (332; E 756)

The exultation that bursts out in William's letter to Hayley spills over into Kate's mind as well. She experiences a parallel vision, in which she confronts her own "malevolent Spirit" (336). Like William, Catherine is finally able to detach herself from the struggle between her two selves. "And I forgave myself for the Envy which had been my besetting Sin all my life" (337).

William's inspiration has returned. He engraves the title pages of both *Milton*, already almost complete, and *Jerusalem*, on which he is about to embark. Now at last he and Kate are able to open their hearts to one another, to speak with frankness of their marriage. "He confessed to me his anger at my Jealousies, and I to him my Resentment of his talent and how I sometimes felt like a slave to it .... So we forgave each other" (338).

Every part of this novel reveals that its author, whose scholarly credentials include *Blake and the Language of Art* (1984), is steeped in the milieu of William and Catherine Blake. The reader gains an unobtrusive awareness of how they adapt themselves to their successive residences, and a detailed knowledge of their workplaces, working materials, techniques of production. The events of their lives and the processes of creating their works play out against the background of friends, acquaintances, professional connections. The settings are the city of London and the countryside round about, at a time when Catherine could look out from a window of Hercules Buildings in Lambeth towards cornfields and hedges just to the south of the city; and Felpham, where from the bedroom of their cottage they could see windmills and the endless sea. Outside this whitewashed "Palace" (E 711) of flint and cobbles, "the smell of the sea mingled with the wild purple thyme that grew under our feet and in the meadow" (263)—lightly foreshadowing the transcendent vision of "Los's Messenger to Eden" that Blake was to record in *Milton* (E 136). Warner's easy familiarity with the whole corpus of Blake's writings as well as the finer details of his visual art enables her, without any undue sense of affectation, to use this vast body of work as the novel's raw material.

It is a tribute to Janet Warner's skill as a writer that all this scholarship does not weigh down the narrative. The effect of the richness of detail is often like the texture of a finely worked tapestry—as in Kate's account of painting the images of *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*:

We had pigments of Prussian blue, gamboge, yellow ochre, rose madder, vermilion, and others, which we mixed with gum arabic, or more often carpenter's glue for body and adhesiveness, and then a mix of glycerine, honey and a drop of ox gall. William said that the sacred Carpenter, Joseph, had revealed that secret to him.

We would choose a wash for the print, and then gradually layer on the colours until the pages glowed like jewels. (138)

But this is, after all, a novel about a marriage. Warner subtly conveys a sense of the "bottom line," the mind-blowingly mundane needs and life events that, in the end, actually do sustain a marriage partnership. There are moments when Kate is embittered by what she sees as the limitations of her role: "I cook your meals, and sew your shirts, and make our candles, and help with the printing press—but it isn't enough for you" (117). A glimpse "from the outside" of a similar situation appears in the form of Mary Wollstonecraft's disillusioned comment on the perfidy of the (married) man she loves at that time, Blake's friend Henry Fuseli: "He has taught me to scorn convention ... but he retreats into it with Sophia [Fuseli's wife] at every opportunity" (139). Kate observes Fuseli and his wife one evening, when "something about [Sophia's] shrewd expression reminded me suddenly of the women in Henry's erotic drawings" (142). She recalls how Sophia is depicted in these works of her husband—"the Cruelty of her expression ... the bare breasts like orbs of power above elaborate corsets ..." (153)—and realizes that the power of the shrewd, conventional Sophia over her husband is "based on her dominating eroticism on the one hand, and her obedient submission in the eyes of the world" (153). Sophia is to Fuseli neither more nor less than the essential complement to his true nature that Kate is to her own husband. "Poor Mary" (142), Kate thinks: idealist that she is, Mary will never understand this paradox.

At a later time, Mary attempts (unsuccessfully) to drown herself when forced eventually to recognize that her American lover Gilbert Imlay has deceived and abandoned her. There was a time when Kate had envied Mary's "brilliant wit" and deplored her own lack of it: "When the world treated me ill, I had to use cunning" (104). Now, comparing Mary to herself, she reflects on the life-preserving value of "ordinariness" and the hidden benefits of menial daily chores.
I could never be like her, so ready to abandon myself to Feeling, to cast myself into a cold river for love. But of course, I was no Genius. I had no maid named Marguerite to help with the tasks of everyday life as Mary did. I had no Wife to mend my clothes and empty my chamber-pot as William had. (221)

Warner’s characterizations, especially of those in the Blakes’ circle, are sharp and convincing. Fuseli—“monkey-like and energetic, with a large head of hair powdered white and combed back from his face” (89); Mary Wollstonecraft, who “drew people to her like a Magnet ... her pale oval face and prominent hazel eyes radiated intelligence” (102); even the “skinny little bare-headed boy of about nine years” who cleaned the Blakes’ chimney, “all black with soot, his eyes staring hugely out of his darkened face, sores on his knees and elbows” (166); each is luminously individualized.

I do have reservations about certain of Janet Warner’s inventions. Kate’s lover Paul-Marc Philipon is a feasible creation, well realized, but after Kate has learned of his death in France, his mysterious reappearance in Chichester has for me unfortunate overtones of the revival of Dallis’s Bobby Ewing. The séance-like meetings to which Kate is taken by her sister Sarah Banes: these rather precious gatherings of a group of Wise Women who give themselves flowery names—Sister Violet, Sister Gentian, and so on—may provide Kate with an opportunity to analyze her own life situation through the medium of tarot cards, but nevertheless seem somewhat unnecessarily contrived.

Other fictional additions do seem to me plausible. William and Catherine’s dabbling in the use of hallucinogenic drugs—laudanum and “Jimson weed” (obtained through Blake’s sister Cathy, a herbalist)—parallels the documented drug-induced visions of other artists and writers of this period (Coleridge and Thomas De Quincey come to mind). Kate’s experimentation with automatic writing, when early drafts of passages from The Four Zoas are dictated to her by disembodied voices (though she realizes that she is actually “reading William’s mind” [184]), suggests experiences recorded by one of Blake’s most ardent admirers, W. B. Yeats, and his wife. Kate’s other experiments, in art forgery, would have been eminently possible. She was quite capable of making drawings in a style almost indistinguishable from that of her husband. Warner has Kate making credible drawings also in the styles of Flaxman and Fuseli. When the Blakes are financially pressed (as in real life they so often were), she passes her drawings off as originals, and sells them to the dealer Paul Colnaghi, who, “eyes wide open, paid me very well ...” (184). Did the real Catherine Blake ever try that, I wonder? If she did, she might easily have got away with it.

In terms of hard facts, we may never know much more about the historical Catherine Blake than we do now, which is little enough. The Kate who emerges from Warner’s novel is tough-minded, yet loving and loyal; resourceful and practical, and at the same time sensitively perceptive. Admittedly, she is a personage in a work of fiction, but to me she seems a credible approximation to the woman who sustained the daily life of William Blake for forty-five years, inspired and supported his work, and collaborated with him in producing it.

In reviewing Barbara Lachman’s Voices for Catherine Blake some years ago, I wrote

To fictionalize the biography or autobiography of an historical personage is a perilous undertaking, the more so when the person concerned lived in such intimate propinquity as Catherine did to a milieu continuously raked over, mined, and sifted through by scholars with diverse special interests.

Janet Warner has confronted these perils and emerged triumphant, for two very basic reasons: the breadth and depth of her scholarship, and the soundness of her literary craftsmanship.

21. Freed 149.

Works Cited


19. Richard Ellmann writes: “Nothing that had happened to [Yeats] before was more dramatically exciting than the automatic writing of his wife, which he felt put wisdom at last within his reach” (224).

20. Three surviving drawings have been authenticated as the work of Catherine Blake: Butlin 1: 625-26; 2: plates 348, 1191,1192.